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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I challenge the dominant conception of gift giving in the
Iliad. In Chapter 1 I show that the textual evidence does not support the
idea that diﬀerent categories of gift giving are denoted by word choice.
In Chapter 2, I show that modern theories are not able to explain
perfectly the instances of gift giving in the Iliad. Furthermore, I show
that the use or avoidance of gift terms in the poem can carry meaning.
In Chapter 3, I take the conclusions from the previous two chapters and
apply them to a focused analysis of the exchange between Diomedes and
Glaukos in Iliad 6, showing that the language of the scene can allow us
to analyse the exchange as more than only an instance of gift giving.

KEYWORDS: Gifts, Iliad, Homer, Epic, Diomedes, Glaukos
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE

This thesis is concerned with the act of gift giving in the epic poem the
Iliad, the oldest surviving piece of ‘Western’ literature, which tells part
of the story of the Trojan War.
Since the publication of Marcel Mauss’ structuralist interpretation of
gift giving in 1925, scenes of gift giving in the Iliad have been analysed
in a reductionist manner, with some believing that every gift serves the
purpose of negotiating status between donor and recipient. I argue,
instead, that the language of the poem resists such a universalising
interpretation.
Relying on a close reading of the text, I analyse the vocabulary
associated with object exchange in a number of scenes in the Iliad. I
focus in particular on the armour exchange between the Greek hero
Diomedes and the Trojan hero Glaukos in Book 6. I show that the
language of this scene diﬀers from all other instances of gift exchange in
the poem. This suggests, on the one hand, that the scene cannot
uncritically be interpreted as that of gift giving, and, on the other hand,
that this problematizes the universality of anthropological gift theory.
iii
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT

All translations to be found in this thesis are the author’s own,
unless otherwise noted. The transliteration used throughout for Greek
follows the Library of Congress system. The transliteration of Russian
follows the Scientific transliteration of Cyrillic system.
In the majority of cases, the text of the original language is supplied
in the body or footnotes along with the translation, and important
elements of quoted passages are underlined in both the original and in
English translation.
The Latin-based text of this thesis is set in Adobe Caslon Pro, a
typeface designed by Carol Twombly for Adobe based on eighteenth
century specimens originally designed by William Caslon.* Greek and
Cyrillic text is set in Minion Pro, designed, also for Adobe, by Robert
Slimbach and based on late Renaissance types. The sans-serif titling is
set in Myriad Pro, a humanist typeface designed by both Twombly and
Slimbach, once again for Adobe.

*

For a brief overview of the history of Caslon, see Lawson 1990: ch.15.
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Жизнь ведь тоже только миг,†
After all, life is but a moment too,

Только растворенье
Only dissolution

Нас самих во всех других
Of ourselves in everybody else

Как бы им в даренье.
Like the giving of a gift.‡

Ты отдал мне не тот подарок,
You gave me not that gift,

Который издалека вез.
Which from far away you brought.

Казался он пустой забавой
To you, it seemed an empty amusement

В тот вечер огненный тебе.
On that fiery evening.

И стал он медленной отравой
And it became a slow poison

В моей загадочной судьбе.
In my mysterious destiny.
И он всех бед моих предтеча, —
And it was the precursor of all my misfortunes, —

Не будем вспоминать о нем!..
We will not think about it!...§

†

The Cyrillic and interlinear Latin text of these epigraphs is set in Garamond Premier
Pro, a typeface designed by Robert Slimbach for Adobe, based on the sixteenth century
type designed by Claude Garamond (see Lawson 1990: ch.10 for a historical account).
‡
Doctor Zhivago, ch.17 (from the poem “Свадьба”, “Wedding”). The final line follows
the translation in Pevear and Volokhonsky 2010.
§
Anna Akhmatova 1956 (poem 9 in the cycle “шиповник цветет”, “The Sweetbriar
Blooms”). The poem’s text is from Akhmatova 1990: 250.
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1

INTRODUCTION

S

ince the publication of Mauss’ influential article L’essai sur le
don, gift theory has been heavily dependent on the conclusions
drawn

from

his

research.1

Since

then,

succeeding

anthropologists have been arguing against some of the conclusions
reached by Mauss, but still ultimately focus on the politico-economic
conclusions which are present in the Essai. Unfortunately, classicists
have tended not to follow the trail of criticism of Mauss: following M.
I. Finley’s The World of Odysseus, scholars are seemingly content to
assume Mauss’ conclusions of obligation and reciprocity and total
prestations. Nowhere else in Classics is this more evident than in
Homeric studies. Indeed, many classicists go beyond simple theory and

1

This is not to say, however, that before Mauss, the gift and gift giving were not a
subject of concern for authors. Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 1136b5–10), as we will see below,
had already begun to make some observations about the eﬀects of giving on one’s status
or honour. In his Notes from a Dead House (1.10 [1860–2]), Dostoevsky too makes his
own observations about the altered state of gift giving at Christmas in his prison: “Всё
принималось с одинаковою благодарностью, без различия даров и
даривших.” (“All was accepted with identical gratitude, without the distinction of
gifts and givers”). We also find in Pushkin’s The Captain’s Daughter a commentary on
Slavic gift giving practices (Bethea 2009: ch.12). Even though these authors are
engaging with important theoretical issues in gift giving, they lack the sense of
sustained enquiry which we find in Mauss and his successors.

2
attempt to create not only ‘Homeric’ economies from the Homeric
poems, but entire ‘Homeric’ anthropologies, a practice which goes back
to antiquity. For, as Snodgrass writes, “the belief that the social system
portrayed in the Homeric poems…[is] in large measure both unitary
and historical…has been alive since Classical times.”2 This practice, I
believe, fails on a number of levels. The creation of a full or partial
anthropology for a society which we cannot observe—and even through
observation there arise numerous problems: namely, as Levi-Strauss
writes, the observer will only ever be able to understand the foreign
practices subjectively3—is highly problematic, and all the more so for a
society for which our data consists only of two poems and comparatively
little archaeological remains.4 The two pieces of writing (the Iliad and
the Odyssey) on which scholars, out of necessity, usually rely in their
anthropologies, are also problematic. Composed traditionally from oralpoetic formulae and stories over centuries and in diﬀerent regions, these
writings cannot be assumed to reflect a ‘society’ or ‘culture’ that ever
existed in one time or one place. This problem, however, does not stop

2

Snodgrass 1974: 114.
Levi-Strauss 1997: 49–51. See also Bourdieu 1977: ch.1.
4
This is not to take a stand on the relative chronology of the Homeric epics and
Hesiod, but rather only that the Hesiodic poems depict a world which is diﬀerent from
the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey. See West 2006 for an argument that dates Hesiod
before the Homeric epics.
3

3
scholars from writing about the ‘Homeric’ economy, or even ‘Homeric’
culture in general. No one who sets out to write a comprehensive
cultural study of 19th century Russia would be able to create an accurate
cultural history using as their sources only Dostoevsky’s Crime and
Punishment and Gogol’s Dead Souls: they are pieces of fiction, just like
Homeric poetry: idealised, full of generic tropes, which is an even bigger
problem for Homer than for Dostoevsky and Gogol given the
limitations of oral composition. Indeed, this point is made especially
clear in Auerbach’s Mimesis, which shows that the modes by which an
author represents reality are neither uniform nor do they necessarily
portray an accurate representation of reality.5 That is not to say that
nothing in Homer reflects some society (or societies) which did in fact
exist, even if not at the same time or same place.6
This study, then, will not claim to oﬀer an account of ‘Homeric’ gift
exchange reflecting some inauthentic society, nor even an account of

5

Auerbach 2003. We find in Auerbach’s selection reality being subservient to the goals
of the author. Even though, arguably, reality is the same for Homer and Virginia
Woolf, the way they both choose to represent it is extremely diﬀerent. See, however,
de Beauvoir 2011 for an existentialist account of realism in literature.
6
e.g. Seaford 1994: 6, “although Homeric epic does not give us a photograph of an
actual society, neither is it merely an ideological construction… The proportions in
which it reflects reality or ideology are impossible to know;” Martindale 1993: 48,
“…all texts are only texts, and that none gives us unmediated access to ‘reality’ or ‘the
truth’”; and Figes 2002: 104 “no novel is a direct window on to life and… we cannot
take these observations as an accurate reflection of reality.”

4
Iliadic gift exchange, as it obtains within the poem itself. For as we will
see, the data from the poem itself makes this extremely diﬃcult. Instead,
my goal is to explore how the language used can convey nuances which
seem to be lost in scholars’ tendencies to abstract,7 or in the reading of
the poem with the assumption of some form of Maussian exchange
being at work. Ultimately, I am pursuing an aesthetic reading of gifts in
the Iliad. A word about this term ‘aesthetic’: in using this term I have in
mind an approach to the text which is rooted in the poetic qualities of
the text, such as the approach for which John Miles Foley advocates,
discussed below. I do not use ‘aesthetic’ as a philosophical term here;
thus ‘aesthetic’ can be read as equivalent to a term such as ‘poetic’.
This thesis will aim to approach gift giving from a literary point-ofview. In recent decades there has been a trend to politicise literature,
which is to say, to read literature not so much on aesthetic grounds, but
on underlying political grounds.8 I do not wish to argue against political
readings, since works of art (regardless of in what medium they are
composed) are part of a larger political culture, and no doubt do make
use of political or ideological realities, but I do wish to illustrate the
problems which arise from the sort of purely reductionist political

7

By which I mean the tendency of theorists to abstract textual or observational
evidence into an underlying theory.
8
Aubry 2018: 1–9.

5
readings which seem to have been popular. For example, Donlan and
van Wees both seem to believe that gifs in the Iliad (and more generally
in Homer) serve political and/or economic ends.9 Paradoxically, the
recent trend of reading literature politically has resulted in less emphasis
being placed upon the poem’s words, for what is literature without
language? Ultimately, I hope to advance novel readings of gift giving
scenes which have heretofore been understood merely on political bases.
It will be beneficial here to briefly oﬀer a justification and description
of the methodological apparatus for the approach I will be taking, for it
presupposes that the Iliad is a work of verbal art. This is not a universally
accepted position. For example, in discussing to charge of mechanism
in the Homeric poems, Foley writes that “many critics have voiced
essentially the same objection: the attractive hypothesis of an oral poet’s
ready-made diction and narrative patterns simply leaves no room for
verbal art.”10 This view seems to pose problems not just for the artistic
consideration of poetry composed in oral traditions (regardless of
language), but for art as a whole until very recently. Indeed, all forms of
art have traditionally been bound to a series of rules restricting the
‘freedom’ of the artists’ expression.11 For example, in music, classical

9

Donlan 1997: 663. van Wees 1992.
Foley 1997: 164. See also Foley 1999: ch.1.
11
Of course, there are problems when defining ‘art’ with a set of necessary conditions.
Furthermore, the concept of ‘art’ as we use it today, so as to mean ‘fine art(s)’ is a
10

6
Western compositions were, until modern experiments of tonality,
bound by strict rules of composition, but composers are and were able
to create unique works of art within the ruleset imposed upon them.
Similarly, traditional ‘literature’ was also bound to the rules of language
and genre (until again the 20th century experimentalists such as James
Joyce or Virginia Woolf began to deviate in terms of use of language
and/or generic constraint). In eﬀect, critics have argued that the Oral
Theory of composition seems to reduce the entire work to a series of
necessary formulaic reči.12 In addition to the above defence of rulegoverned art, I side with Foley, who argues that formulaic phrases,
following his theory of traditional referentiality, are more than simply
metrically-necessary stop-gaps.13 Instead, formulae are used to refer not
just to the exact lexical meaning of the formula, but to evoke “‘the entire
heroic portrayal, complete with its mythic history and contradictions, as

modern phenomenon, and whether or something can be retroactively declared art is
debated. See, e.g. Crownther 2004; Wilson 2018.
12
From a Slavic root bearing meaning associated with speech. Cf. Pr.Slav. *rečь,
‘speech’ which provides reflexes in all branches of Slavic (Derksen 2007: s.v. *rečь). For
the meaning of it in the context of South Slavic orally-composed poetry, see Foley
1997: 151–159, who argues that reči are poetic morphemes, somewhat equivalent to
linguistic morphemes, i.e. they are the smallest unit of meaning, and can range from
single words to entire story patterns in the minds of the South Slavic guslars.
13
In fact, Nagy (1974: ch.3) argues that the formulae helped to condition the epic
metre (in particular the substitutions of dactyls and spondees), seeming to suggest that
the argument of metrical necessity is perhaps backward.
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known to the tradition and as signalled by this phrase.’”14 Foley goes on
to show that this interpretation of formulae is applicable not just to
noun-epithet formulae, but “to the phraseology as a whole,” meaning
that formulaic descriptions and entire scene-types also bear this capacity
of traditional referentiality.15 This theory is enhanced when we consider
Bakker’s scale of interformularity, which he uses to argue for a more
nuanced interpretation of formulaic phrases based on their rate of
appearance, with lesser-used phrases being more highly imbued with
meaning.16 Ultimately, what these approaches to Homeric poetry allow
us to do is interpret the poems (the epics and the hymns, and even later
literature engaging in reception of these texts) as aesthetic compositions,
allowing us to read the words and formulae as meaningful instead of
merely being metrical necessities.
In approaching the text this way, I am not claiming that a political
reading of the poem (or of any piece of literature or art more generally)
is invaluable or secondary to an aesthetic reading of the text. In fact, the
relationship between politics and aesthetics is well discussed in

14

Foley 1997: 167–168. His quotation is referring specifically to the formulaic epithet
“swift-footed Achilles”, but is applicable to any epithet.
15
Foley 1997: 168. Foley (1997: 168–169) discusses briefly the two descriptive
formulae hypodra idôn (‘looking darkly’) and pukinon epos (‘intimate word’) as examples.
16
See Bakker 2013: 157–169 for a full account of his theory.

8
philosophy.17 What I do wish to do, however, is add another dimension
to the interpretation of gifts in the Iliad (and I believe that such an
approach will be beneficial to other literature as well), for the dominant
approach in the scholarship is to read scenes of gift exchange as political
or economic.18 I draw attention away from the political aspect of the
phenomenon of gift exchange and toward the language and poetic
context of scenes of gift exchange in order to illustrate the added
interpretive benefit of such an approach.
The focus of this research has been limited to the Homeric epic poem
the Iliad. There are many reasons for limiting the study to only a single
text. To begin, the poem itself provides us with an abundance of data
for analysis: expanding the study even to both of the Homeric epics
would prove to be too much material for the present study. (Although
the Odyssey, along with other archaic poetry, and even later works of
prose, will inevitably play a part in our discussion). Furthermore, based
on the textual idiosyncrasies that exist between the Iliad and the Odyssey
it seems best to treat only a single work in a study so heavily based on

17

This relationship is especially present in the work of Jacques Rancière (e.g. Rancière
2011 and Rancière 2019). See also Bottici 2019 for a discussion of the imaginal nature
of politics.
18
There are some analyses of the Diomedes-Glaukos exchange which read the scene
in a poetic context rather than strictly politically; these are discussed below (ch.3).

9
the language of the received text.19 For following modern semantic
theory, each speaker of a language will have certain variances in their
internal understanding of what a certain word means, therefore
including both the Iliad and the Odyssey in this study would only serve
to undermine the unity of the project.20 To illustrate this point, we can
consider the diﬀering formulaic patterns between each of the poems,
which to me is indicative of the works belonging to separate traditions.21
We can add to this the argument that the word mythos has a diﬀerent
meaning in the Odyssey than in the Iliad,22 suggesting that cross-poem
semantic analyses are problematic if they aim at a universalising
conclusion.
In Chapter One, following the work of Émile Benveniste, I will apply
a strictly philological approach to the text.23 Namely, I will examine
individual gift terms used throughout the poem for what Benveniste
claims to be diﬀerent aspects of gift giving, and, in doing so, I aim to

19

The fiercely debated ‘Homeric Question’ will largely be left to the side for the
purposes of this study. For a sustained argument for the composition of the Iliad by a
single poet over a prolonged period of time, see West 2011 (and West 2013 for an
argument of the same style about the Odyssey). See Edmunds 2016: 5–7 for a very brief
overview of Nagy’s and West’s disagreement.
20
Martindale 1993: 88. “…no two users of the ‘same’ language use names, or words in
general, identically, since the field of meaning will vary in each case.”
21
This problem of interpretation is further compounded if we assume that the poems
have been composed by a number of bards over a long period of time.
22
Clark 2001.
23
Benveniste 1997.
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illustrate the problems which arise when we begin to discuss the text
with a preconceived notion of gift exchange theory. Instead, I will argue
that the individual words which Benveniste chooses to discuss are, on
etymological grounds, on oral-poetic grounds, and on contextual
grounds, incapable of denoting specific types of gifts. Expanding beyond
the handful of Greek nouns which Benveniste analyses, I include a
selection of additional adjectives and verbs which further serve to show
that analyses must be carried out with as little bias for a specific
underlying structure of gift giving as possible.
My justification for spending so much time on the philological data
of a typically theoretical or anthropological field is that the text being
studied is itself dependant on language. The scholarship concerning the
composition of the Iliad is voluminous, but, regardless of the original
method of composition, the text we have and are working with is a fixed
text. Thus, a great focus will be placed on the words which are preserved
by the text.24 Unlike Mauss’ study, which was based upon data obtained
from first-person observation by integrating into the target society,
enquiring about, and participating in the society’s practices, we must

24

For various arguments concerning the composition of the Iliad, see: West 2011;
Lord 1964; Turner 1997.

11
first be concerned with the language of the poem.25 Only after
establishing the nuances of language used for the various aspects of gift
giving can we begin to approach the poem from a theoreticanthropological position. An example to illustrate the necessity of
having a sound philological grounding before considering the
theoretical and practical aspects of gift giving can be found in Richmond
Lattimore’s English translation of the Iliad. Although generally
considered to be a standard translation of the Iliad, there are numerous
instances where Lattimore has translated the same Greek word with
diﬀerent English words, or where he has departed from the original
Greek and supplied the word ‘gift’ where the Greek itself is silent: one
example, for instance Lattimore translates the same word, dôra as both
‘favours’ and ‘gifts’ at Il. 3.64–65.26 In order to avoid making the mistake
of considering as a gift something that is not a gift, or the opposite, it is
necessary to examine thoroughly the language of the text.
Following the philological investigation, we will concern ourselves
with the practical nature of gift giving. That is to say, we will look at

25

Although, as we will see below, Mauss is criticized by later scholars for his
misunderstanding of textual data. See, e.g. Levi-Strauss 1997, Sahlins 2017: 134–167.
26
For more examples (inexhaustive), see also Lattimore 2011: 9.261 (dôra as
‘recompense’); 21.165 (dôra omitted); 23.559–562 (Lattimore writes ‘gift’ where Greek
merely says ‘something of great value’ ‘πολέος δέ οἱ ἄξιος ἔσται’); 24.502 (apoina
‘ransom’ translated as ‘gifts’).
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selected instances of gift giving in the text of the poem, paying attention
to both those things explicitly called gifts and those things which are
merely said to have been given by someone to another. My hope in this
section is to illustrate the aesthetic qualities which arise from reading
the scenes of giving with an attention to the language used. Especially
important for this section will be Donna Wilson’s work on Book 9 of
the Iliad, which provides us with an exceptional analysis of the poetic
distinction between poinê and apoina, which ultimately shows, I believe,
that the specific language used by the poet or characters in the poem is
meaningful.27 With respect to force terms, Stocking writes that ““The
very fact of the multiplicity of force terms makes it such that the use of
biê in Nestor’s speech to designate “force” is itself marked. Metrical
arguments aside, we must consider why biê is used in Nestor’s speech
and not one of the other many force terms.”28 I believe that the same
logic may be used in our case here, since the gift terms are often used in
place of another, perhaps more fitting, term such as geras, apoina, etc.,
which seems to suggest that the use of dôra, xenêion, or dôtinê, is marked.
We will also see that the notion of a gift seems to be highly problematic
in the poem: often things described as gifts do not conform to the

27

Wilson 1999.
Stocking (forthcoming). See Newton 2009 for a discussion of the guest-gift and
geras being used in such a manner.

28

13
notions of what a gift is in modern theory, but many things which are
clearly not gifts are nevertheless described as such. Ultimately, I argue
that the very use (or disuse) of a word meaning gift is important in the
interpretation of the scene in question.
Lastly, following the groundwork laid in the first two chapters, we
will apply the methodology to the famous exchange between Diomedes
and Glaukos in Book 6 of the Iliad. This chapter aims to make use of
the approach taken in the first two chapters and oﬀer a sustained
argument and example of the benefits of pursuing a reading with close
attention paid to the language of the scene. Therefore, this chapter puts
forth a novel reading of the scene by approaching it from an altogether
new angle and drawing linguistic comparisons to other scenes both
within the Iliad, with other hexameter poetry, and with later Greek
literature.

14

1
PHILOLOGY

T

he Iliad survives as a text. The exact manner, however, in
which the poem was composed remains a debate in the
current scholarly literature.29 It is out of the scope of this

thesis to argue about the origins of the Iliad which we possess, but the
fact that we are working with a piece of literature is important for the
approach which will be undertaken.
In this section I aim to examine thoroughly the language of gift giving
in the Iliad. In so doing, I am following the example of Benveniste in
examining the semantic diﬀerences (if there be any) between the
diﬀerent words the poet uses to denote a ‘gift’.30 Although I will refer to
a ‘poet’ of the Iliad here and elsewhere, it is necessary to keep in mind
the large body of oral-formulaic traditional material out of which the

29

The two general sides of this debate are between those who believe the poem to be
orally composed from a long tradition with material coming from many bards, while
the other end of the spectrum argues that a single poet composed the poem with the
aid of writing. Ultimately, it seems to me that some combination of the two extremes
is most likely. For the Oral school, see e.g. Lord 1964, Nagy 1996. For the other side,
see West 2011.
30
Benveniste 1948–49.

15
finalised Iliad was composed. This large body of traditional material is
responsible for the various formulaic phrases which make up the poem.31
In addition to the consideration aﬀorded to the word choices made by
the ‘poet’, discussion will also include consideration for how specific
word choice might evoke for the audience a certain response. For as John
Miles Foley argues, the audience is an important part of the performance
of traditional, oral-derived works, and even in textual format the reader
plays a participatory role in determining the meaning of the words,
phrases, or scenes.32
In his article “Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary,”
Benveniste attempts to tease out diﬀerent shades of meaning from five
Greek words which all denote the basic meaning of ‘gift’: dôs, dosis,
dôron, dôrea, dôtinê. He does this by examining the contexts in which the
words appear in the Homeric epics, but does not examine the analogous
contexts which use diﬀerent nouns. Ultimately, he arrives at a
conclusion which is merely description of the scene.
With the exception of dôs, (a Hesiodic hapax) and dôrea (for it does
not appear in the Iliad), I will consider the usage of the remaining three,

31

See e.g. Foley 1997. These formulaic phrases, if we can project modern Slavic oral
poetic thought onto the ancient oral poets, have been described as having morphemic
qualities (Parry Collection 6619, cited in Foley 1997: 152).
32
Foley 1991: 42–45.
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as well as some additional nouns, in order to demonstrate that, except
in one case, gift terms do not denote specific types of gifts. Following
the discussion of nouns, we will then consider adjectives and verbs which
appear alongside the nouns for ‘gift’. In these two sections I aim to
illustrate that the poem uses not only nouns, but the adjective and verbs
connected with gift giving in a way which does not support such a
nuanced structure of gift giving: there does not seem to be linguistic
evidence for the division of gift giving into sub-types.

2.1 NOUNS
2.1.1 Dosis
This word appears but once in the Iliad (10.213). On the meaning of the
noun, Benveniste comments, “in dosis the notion is presented as an
eﬀective accomplishment; it is the act of giving susceptible of being
realized in a gift.”33 In other words, dosis is taken to refer to a type of gift
giving where the gift is promised in the future upon completion of a
requested action. This word appears in Nestor’s proposal of a nighttime
reconnaissance mission to the Trojan camp. Nestor has just asked
whether any of the Greeks are brave enough to carry out the mission,
promising to whoever accepts the mission:

33

Benveniste 1948: 35.
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…καὶ ἂψ᾽ εἰς ἡμέας ἔλθοι
ἀσκηθής· μέγα κέν οἱ ὑπουράνιον κλέος εἴη
πάντας ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, και οἱ δόσις ἒσσεται ἐσθλή·
Il. 10.211–213

“… [if] he comes back to us
unscathed, there would be great glory, far and wide,
for him among all men, and he will have an excellent gift.”

It must be noted that this singular occurrence of dosis is found in a book
which is typically believed to be a later addition to the text.34 In addition
to this being the only instance of the word itself in the Iliad, it is also the
only example of the so-called ‘dative of the possessor’ grammatical
construction being used in the context of gift giving in Homer. Could the
isolated usage of this noun in this book merely be coincidental? Even if
this occurrence of dosis be ‘inauthentic’ to the original text (i.e. a later
interpolation by an author who is not responsible for the other twentythree books of the Iliad),35 it should still be profitable to examine its use

34

See Dué and Ebbott 2010 for recent discussion concerning Iliad 10 as well as a survey
of past scholarship.
35
The placement of book-divisions in the Iliad (and Odyssey) has been a matter of
debate. For discussion concerning the division of the Iliad into books, see Heiden
1998, 2000 for an argument in favour of the book divisions being “designed and
textualized by the composer himself” (2000: 81).
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here, and especially to compare it against the uses in other contemporary
poems, viz. the Odyssey and the poems of Hesiod, in which the word
appears with a relatively higher frequency. This examination will serve to
illustrate that dosis is used in the hexameter tradition without the
implication of having a nuance denoting a specific type of gift giving.
Benveniste notes that in the Iliad, dosis is used to denote a future
recompense for a deed yet to be carried out.36 Although Benveniste’s
interpretation of dosis accurately reflects the scene, I do not believe there
is suﬃcient evidence for attributing such a specific semantic meaning to
the word. Indeed, can one draw a conclusion about such a specific
meaning of a word from only a single instance? Furthermore, each
speaker of a language understands the same word diﬀerently, and a
single speaker can also mean diﬀerent things when using the same
word.37 Thus, we cannot with any certainty come to a conclusion about
what specific shade of meaning dosis might carry in a larger sample size.
My hopes here are to examine the etymology of dosis and then continue
by examining the usage of the word in other authors, in order to
demonstrate that dosis does not carry with it a specific meaning
suggesting the anticipated reciprocity.

36
37

Benveniste 1948: 35.
Evans 2009: 3.
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Etymologically, the noun is formed from the verb-stem do- (‘to
give’),38 to which is aﬃxed the suﬃx -sis, which serves to substantivize
the verb and create an action noun.39 Based on the etymology, dosis
seems to lack an intrinsic meaning of a gift which will be provided in
the future upon completion of services rendered.40 Thus, the noun seems
to bear a rather generic meaning which might be expressed as ‘the act of
giving’.
When we compare the six occurrences of dosis in the Odyssey and in
Hesiod against the lone use in the Iliad, we see that there is no evidence
for such a specific meaning. For example, dosis’ use in the Odyssey (4.651)
contradicts the overly specific meaning Benveniste has imposed upon
the word. In this instance, we read:

τὸν δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ Ἀντίνοος προσέφη Εὐπείθεος υἱος
αὐτος ἑκών οἱ δῶκα· τί κεν ῥέξειε καὶ ἄλλος,
ὁππότ᾽ ἀνὴρ τοιοῦτος ἔχων μελεδήματα θυμῷ
αἰτίζῃ; χαλεπόν κεν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν εἴη.
Od. 4.648–651

And then Antinoös, son of Eupeitheos, addressed him,
“I myself gave it willingly: what else could someone do,

38

From the PIE root *deh3- ‘give’.
CGCG 23.27.
40
Benveniste 1948: 35.
39
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when such a man, having anxiety in his heart,
begs? It would be diﬃcult to refuse giving.”

We can see that the meaning of the word here is in line with its
etymology. Rather than denoting a specific type of gift, we find that dosis
is used only to refer to the act of giving in general. At Od. 18.287, the
same sentiment is expressed with the noun dosis. When Penelope is
being courted by suitors, Antinoös, a suitor, tells her that “it is not noble
to refuse the act of giving” (“οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν ἐστίν”).
The other instances of dosis simply bear the basic meaning of ‘gift’,
which seems to indicate that the semantic field of the noun has widened
from its strictly etymological definition, i.e. from the meaning of ‘the act
of giving’. There is no evidence, however, that the semantic field has
narrowed with the result that it carries such a specific meaning
conjectured by Benveniste. For instance, in Hesiod the word appears
once in both the Theogony and the Opera et Dies. In the Theogony (93),
Hesiod writes, in reference to the ability of a king to speak well: τοίη
Μουσέων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν (“such is the sacred gift of the Muses
to mankind”). In the Opera, he writes:
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μηδέ ποτ᾽ οὐλομένην πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ
τέτλαθ᾽ ὀνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἰέν ἐόντων.
Hes. Opera 717–718

Do not ever allow [yourself] to reproach destructive, lifedestroying poverty in a man, [it is] always a gift from the
blessed ones.

Both of these Hesiodic examples, together with the examples from the
Odyssey, illustrate the lack of intrinsic semantic specificity in the
meaning of the word. Although the word may indeed diverge from its
etymological meaning of ‘the act of giving’, and in some places bear the
meaning ‘gift’, in none of these instances does dosis have any specific
nuance in meaning.41 Thus, the use of the word in the Iliad, as
Benveniste argues, is used as evidence of a semantically narrowed type
of ‘gift’. Rather, it seems to me that the comparative evidence seems to
favour a more general meaning, and that the use of the word in the Iliad
has no relation to the type of reciprocity being oﬀered.
In addition to examining uses of dosis outside of the Iliad, we will
now examine passages in the Iliad which have a similar structure but
employ diﬀerent gift terms. Consideration of similar passages in the

41

A widened semantic field is a completely normal linguistic process in natural
languages.
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Iliad itself which mirror the context of our original passage will help to
demonstrate further that there is no inherent semantic nuance in the
word. Later in Book 10, during the Trojan scene analogous to the one
cited above, Hektor uses a diﬀerent noun for the oﬀering of a gift to the
man who undertakes the reconnaissance mission:

τίς κέν μοι τόδε ἔργον ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειε
δώρῳ ἔπι μεγάλῳ; μισθὸς δε οἱ ἄρκιος ἔσται.
Il. 10.303–304

“Who would undergo and accomplish this deed
For a great gift? The reward will be suﬃcient for him.”

One would expect the same noun, dosis, to have been used here if it bore
some significant meaning related to the reward of future deeds.42
Instead, we find that the standard word for ‘gift’ (doron) is used.
I wish to consider a second passage which portrays an analogous
situation of a gift being promised for the completion of an action:

Ὕπνε, ἄναξ πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων,
ἠμὲν δή ποτ᾽ ἐμὸν ἔπος ἔκλυες, ἠδ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν

42

Throughout the poem the poet often uses the same lines verbatim (a feature of oral
poetry), and it is interesting that here the poet would choose to use a diﬀerent phrase
if indeed dosis were an especial word for the context.
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πείθευ· ἐγὼ δε κέ τοι ἰδέω χάριν ἤματα πάντα.
κοίμησόν μοι Ζηνὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀφρύσιν ὄσσε φαεινώ
αὐτίκ᾽ ἐπεί κεν ἐγὼ παραλέξομαι ἐν φιλότητι,
δῶρα δε τοι δώσω καλὸν θρόνον, ἄφθιτον αἰεί…
Il. 14.233–238

“Sleep, lord of all the gods and all the men,
if you ever listened to my word before, then now
obey, and I will know gratitude forever towards you.
put to sleep Zeus’ shining eyes under his brows for me,
and then right away I will lay with him in love
and I will give you gifts: a beautiful throne, eternal…”

This role of the gift in this passage is also analogous to our original
passage with dosis: it is the promise of a future gift upon completion of
a request. It must be noted, however, that unlike in our original passage,
the word used here is not dosis, but dôron. Taken together with Hektor’s
speech above, these two examples seem to show that dosis is not used in
contexts which would favour the nuance of meaning denoting a
promised reciprocity. Instead, we find in both analogous passages that
the poet chooses to use the ‘standard’ noun for ‘gift’, dôron.
Why does dosis appear at Il. 10.213?43 One possibility is the argument
from metrical constraint, which argues that dosis’ position in the line

43

…καὶ ἂψ᾽ εἰς ἡμεB ας ἔλθοι
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disallows the use of another gift term such as dôron. Certainly, dôron
cannot have been used in this specific position due to its diﬀering
metrical shape from dosis (the former is trochaic while the latter is
iambic). One must appreciate, however, that the argument cannot
ignore that fact that it possible to formulate a line which did not require
the noun to occur in the penultimate foot of the line. For an example of
this, we need not look further than Hektor’s Trojan exhort (Il. 10.303304) for an example of the poet composing such a line.
Furthermore, the choice of a unique noun at Il. 10.213 certainly seems
to imply some sort of marked use by the poet. Indeed, the scene (and
the entire Doloneia) is a unique occurrence in the Iliad, modelled on the
Indo-European night-raid motif.44 The word, however, does not appear
in the pseudo-Euripidean Rhesus, which shares the same story-motif as
Book 10. If dosis were somehow traditionally linked to the story pattern,
we might have expected the author of Rhesus to use it in his work.
Furthermore, we might expect other authors who use dosis to employ it
in situations which recall or allude to the Homeric example, which they
do not. Hesiod’s uses of the word, for instance, although slightly marked

ἀσκηθηB ς· μεB γα κεB ν οἱ ὑπουραB νιον κλεB ος εἴη
παB ντας ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρωBπους, και οἱ δοB σις ἒσσεται ἐσθληB ·
44
See Garbutt 2006; Fries 2016. See also Bakker 2013: 157–169 for his discussion on
his scale of interformularity and how infrequent formulae are in a sense more
meaningful.
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in their appearances in gnomic phrases, seem not to allude to the
Homeric passage, or to a night-raid story type.
We might benefit from approaching the question from the other side:
namely, instead of asking what the word does signify, we might ask what
the word does not signify. Following the theories of the Formalists and
John Miles Foley, we can argue that the use of dosis would, instead of
drawing the audience away from the song and to a network of traditional
motifs, would have drawn them into the song and highlight the unique
word and motif being presented.45 In eﬀect, the use of a word which is
so rare in the corpus would have been defamiliarizing for the audience.46

2.1.2 Dôtinê
The second word to which we will turn our attention is dôtinê, which
appears twice in the Iliad. It appears first in a speech by Agamemnon,
in which he lists oﬀ all the compensation (apoina, Il. 9.120) he will give
to Achilles in order to persuade the withdrawn fighter to re-enter the
fight. The second use is in Odysseus’ relay of this same message to
Achilles.47 Because dôtinê, like dosis, only appears in one unique instance

45

On traditional referentiality see Foley 1997; Foley 1991. On Formalism see Schmitz
2007: ch.1; Erlich 1980.
46
Shklovsky 2004.
47
The importance of Agamemnon’s use here of apoina is discussed in Wilson 2002:
75–83.
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in the text, and must approach the problem with the same wariness as
before.
In his speech to the assembled leaders of the Greek army,
Agamemnon famously recounts the numerous compensations he wishes
to give to Achilles in order to placate the discord sown between the two
in the first book of the epic.48 In this speech, in addition to a great
number of other gifts, Agamemnon promises to give Achilles seven
citadels which:

πᾶσαι δ᾽ ἐγγὺς ἁλός, νέαται Πύλου ἠμαθόεντος·
ἐν δ᾽ ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηνες πολυβοῦται,
οἵ κέ ἑ δωτίνῃσι θεὸν ὥς τιμήσουσι…
Il. 9.153–155; 295–297

“are all near the salt-sea, all bordering sandy Pylos
in which men, rich in sheep and rich in cattle, live,
and they will honour him as a god with gifts …”

These same lines are then repeated by Odysseus verbatim when he
delivers the oﬀer to Achilles. Benveniste writes that “the dôtinê, in
Homer, is the obligatory gift oﬀered to a chief whom one wishes to

48

The speech by Agamemnon will provide ample examples of gifts which will be
featured throughout this study below.
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honor … or the gift that is due to one as a guest.”49 Again, as with dosis,
can one really claim that a word which has only a single appearance
throughout the target text has a nuance of meaning so specific? A further
problem for committing to this semantic nuance is that there occur no
other instances in the Iliad of analogous type of giving, we have no other
instance of subjects oﬀering gifts to their lord. The giving featured
elsewhere is among the élite or gods. That Agamemnon seems to imply
that a dôtinê is a gift most appropriate for the gods is also problematic:
for nowhere is someone said to give to a god dôtinê. We might read in
Agamemnon’s oﬀer a sense of deception: he is making false promises to
Achilles in order to convince him to accept the gifts (dôr᾽, Il 9.121) he
oﬀers:50 he tries to elevate Achilles to the status of a god, even though
accepting the oﬀer will subordinate Achilles to Agamemnon.51 In this
reading, the oﬀer is deceptive, but the use of dôtinê does not support the
idea that it is a gift given to a chief by his subjects.
Before considering the use of dôtinê in the Iliad, let us first consider
the uses in the Odyssey. Dôtinê appears twice in the Odyssey in separate

49

Benveniste 1997: 36. The latter definition is only relevant to the Odyssey.
Note that in the next line (Il. 9.121), Agamemnon calls the compensation apoina,
blurring the lines between a gift and a ransom.
51
On the subordination of Achilles by his oﬀer, see Wilson 2002: ch.4.
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contexts. First, it appears when Odysseus recounts to the Phaeacians his
misadventures with Polyphemus:

ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖτε κιχανόμενοι τὰ σὰ γοῦνα
ἱκόμεθ᾽, εἴ τι πόροις ξεινήϊον ἠὲ καὶ ἄλλως
δοίης δωτίνην, ἥ τε ξείνων θέμις ἐστιν.
Od. 9.266–268

“We, arriving, come to your knees,
[to see] if you might oﬀer some host-gift or else if you
might
give some other gift, which is the divine duty of hosts.”

Here it is especially clear that dôtinê bears no specific meaning: for the
poet has said “some other gift,” in contrast to the explicitly mentioned
host-gift in the line above (xeinêion). The meaning of the second
occurrence of dôtinê in the Odyssey also lacks the specific nuance of a gift
of honour for a chief. After Odysseus has finished recounting the story
of his katabasis to the Phaeacians, Arete, the queen, urges them not to
send Odysseus away hastily and without many gifts. Her husband
Alcinoös then replies (Od. 11.336–340):

ξεῖνος δὲ τλήτω μάλα περ νόστοιο χατίζων
ἒμπης οὖν ἐπιμεῖναι ἐς αὔριον, εἰς ὅ κε πᾶσαν
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δωτίνην τελέσω…
Od. 11.350–352

“But permit the guest, though he greatly longs for his return
home,
to stay until tomorrow, and the entire
gift I will procure…”

In her speech, Arete refers to Odysseus as her guest (“ξεῖνος δ᾽ αὖτ᾽
ἐμός ἐστιν”, “he is my guest”; Od. 11.338) without the connotation of him
being a chief whom they are honouring with gifts. Secondly, the noun
which Arete uses for ‘gift’ is not the dôtinê that Alcinoös uses in his
reply, but rather “dôron” (Od. 11.339). It is clear from both Arete’s and
Alcinoös’ speeches that Odysseus is not considered to be a chief. Indeed,
he is a shipwrecked man who is being oﬀered hospitality for a brief
period among them.
If we extend our scope chronologically and consider dôtinê in
Herodotus, we do not find support for considering dôtinê as a gift
specifically for a chief. Herodotus (1.69.4) tells us that when the Spartans
asked to buy gold from the Lydians in order to make a statue, Croesus
gave them the gold as a gift (Κροῖσος δὲ σφι ὠνεομέοισι ἔδωκε δωτίνην).
Later, Herodotus (6.62.1) relates the story of Ariston, the childless king
of Sparta, who contrived a deal in which his friend would give him one
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thing of his possessions. Herodotus uses the noun dôtinê in this case to
mean the thing Ariston will receive from his companion (hetairos). The
use of hetairos makes it clear that the two are on relatively equal terms,
versus if he had subordinated him through the use of a familial term
such as son, which is what we would expect in a chief-subject
relationship. These two Herodotean passages, therefore, do not support
the idea that a dôtinê is a gift specifically for a chief.
I think we are left with no recourse but to argue that the noun, if it
has any specific nuance, would lean only towards the gift given to a guest
by a host. Ultimately, I think that without any analogous comparisons
to the idea of it meaning a gift given by subjects to a chief, we cannot in
good faith ascribe that meaning to the noun: instead one must take it,
strictly semantically, as an alternative to the noun dôron.
Thus, these instances of dôtinê (Il. 9.155, 297) ought to be taken as
marked in some way. We might explain the similarities between a gift
given to a chief and a gift given to a guest by appealing to the status of
a guest in the household of the host. Indeed, throughout the Iliad and
Odyssey we are shown scenes of guests being attended well (e.g. Il.
9.197ﬀ). Furthermore, in light of Agamemnon’s implication that a dôtinê
is fit for a god, we might wish to postulate that he could mean this in a
roundabout way, since Zeus is the god of guest-host interactions and
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failing to uphold the proper etiquette is at risk of incurring Zeus’ wrath.
Thus, giving the guest his due gift would in a way be giving to Zeus as
well (e.g. Od. 9.268).
With this conclusion, we are left with the question of why the poet
chose to use dôtinê for this specific gift Agamemnon is planning to give
to Achilles, especially since any other word meaning gift would not have
been out of place. One possibility, following Donna Wilson’s work on
apoina and poinē and their diﬀerences, is to examine the use of dôtinê as
a tactic employed by Agamemnon.52 As we will see below, dôron is a
noun without any sort of intrinsic semantic nuance, and the entire
episode in Book 9 deals with ‘symbolic violence’, whereby Agamemnon,
in order to maintain his position in the social hierarchy and bring the
war to an end, must appease Achilles’ anger and convince him to rejoin
the battle.53 Agamemnon attempts to accomplish this by choosing
words which both assert his dominance over Achilles, as well as by
oﬀering gifts which also act to establish his authority over Achilles, e.g.
oﬀering Achilles the hand of one of his daughters, which would
eﬀectively subordinate Achilles by the added familial relation. We can
take Wilson’s theory about Agamemnon’s oﬀer to Achilles and apply it
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Wilson 2002: 71–108; Wilson 1999.
Wilson 1999: 143–144; Bourdieu 1990: 127.

32
fruitfully to the occurrence of the noun dôtinê: the occurrence of the
noun indicates, I think, a further attempt by Agamemnon to elevate his
own status. Indeed, where Agamemnon relates that the subjects of
Achilles will bring him gifts and honour him as a god, Agamemnon
especially avoids any further debasement of his own rank, as he will not
oﬀer Achilles any further gifts or honour him, instead others will bring
Achilles gifts. Agamemnon thus avoids himself honouring Achilles as a
god.
Although the use of dôtinê in Homer and Herodotus ultimately does
not support it meaning a type of gift given by subjects to their chief,
there is a broader unifying theme in its uses. In all of the cases cited
above, the gifts in question are of exceptional value, far beyond the
simple sword or cup that seems typical. Thus, if dôtinê were to bear a
meaning which denoted a specific type of gift, it might be seen as
signifying a gift of high value.54

2.1.3 Dôron
The commonest noun in the Iliad used for ‘gift’ is dôron (pl. dôra), with
sixty-eight total occurrences in the poem. Thus, it will provide us with
the most data to analyse and will be an important word when we come
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to the discussion of both the practice and theory of gift giving in the
Iliad. Unlike dosis and dôtinê, since there is more than a single occurrence
of the word in the poem, our discussion will not be so focused on a strict
meaning of the noun. Based on the wide variety in uses, dôron is used to
mean ‘gift’ without any specialised connotation.55 In direct conflict with
Benveniste’s claim that we see the emergence of specialised vocabulary
already by Homer for diﬀerent types of gift, we will see that the poem’s
use of the noun dôron, in a wide variety of contexts, suggests that the
poem is far from having such nuanced views. In fact, dôron is used across
of number of situations which can be analysed as non-gifts from the
point of view of gift theorists.
Modern linguists generally agree that dôron comes from the PIE root
*deh3-ro-, ‘gift’, a root it shares with the verb didômi, ‘I give’.56 In the vast
majority of instances in the Iliad where a gift is given, received, or
exchanged, there occurs a reflex of this PIE root, whether that be a noun,
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other Indo-European languages and their own relation between ‘to give’ and ‘gift’:
Eng. give/gift; Fr. donner/don, Russ. darit’/dar; Germ. geben/Gabe. It seems that in
many languages the idea of a gift arises out of the verbal form meaning to give,
seemingly without any implication about the type of giving being done (i.e. giving for
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voluntarily and for free (OED s.v. gift; CED s.v. gift, which simply directs you to
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consideration).
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verb, or both. There are, however, a few marked exceptions where this
is not the case. Due to the ubiquity of the noun dôron in the Iliad (as
well as in other texts), we cannot here quote and examine each instance
of its use. In lieu of this, we will take a broad look at the diﬀerent uses
the poet makes of the noun. The noun dôron means not just what in
English we would call ‘gift, present’, but is generally used to signify
anything that is given. During the first council in the Iliad, when
Agamemnon is threatening to take Briseis from Achilles, Athene comes
and promises Achilles three times as many gifts (dôra) as have been
taken away from him (Il. 1.213). Here dôron is used to mean roughly a
prize awarded in battle, typically called a geras in Greek. The equivalence
is clear since the original thing taken from Achilles was his geras, Briseis.
Other occurrences throughout the poem range from what we may
consider to be aligned with our general modern conception of a ‘present’
(at least in Western culture), to meaning a ransom (e.g. Il. 22.341). These
may be corporeal (e.g. Il. 6.293; 8.203; 19.3) or incorporeal (e.g. Il. 3.54,
64, 65. All three of which refer to ‘the gifts of Aphrodite’). The latter
reflecting what we might consider to be blessings from the divine.
Ultimately, due to its wide semantic field, it is evident that dôron is
the least specific gift term available to the poet, and in some cases even
strays from what we might normally consider to be a gift. It bears no
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inherent semantic nuance, and instead appears only to signify a gift or
thing given. This wide semantic field will prove useful in the following
section when we examine what exactly a gift is within the scope of the
Iliad.

2.1.4 Xeinêion
Xeinêion occurs four times throughout the Iliad. Unlike the words which
we have discussed above, xeinêion (pl. xeinêia) is perhaps the word most
worthy of being treated as bearing a specific semantic nuance. Indeed,
etymologically the word shares its root with the Greek word xeinos
‘guest, host’ (xenos in Attic).57
The first use of the noun in the Iliad is during Diomedes’ speech to
Glaukos, in which he recounts that their ancestors were guest-friends
who exchanged gifts:

Οἰνεὺς γάρ ποτε δῖος ἀμύμονα Βελλεροφόντην
ξείνις᾽ ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐείκοσιν ἤματ ἐρύξας·
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά.
Il. 6.216–218

“For godlike Oineus received blameless Bellerophon
57

xeinêion is a derivative of xe(i)nos ‘host, guest’ by means of the suﬃx -ion which forms
a neuter noun from a nominal root with the resultant noun generally bearing a meaning
which “denotes an object or action related to” the nominal root (CGCG 23.18).
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as a guest in his halls, keeping him for twenty days.
And they gave to one another beautiful guest-gifts.”

Here, and elsewhere in the Iliad, xeinêion is used specifically to signify
customary gifts exchanged between host and guest (10.268, 11.20,
18.408). Due to the freedom of xenos to mean either ‘guest’ or ‘host’, the
derivative xeinêion is able to fulfil the role of a gift given or received by
either party in the guest-host exchange. The above example illustrates
this by using the same noun to signify the gifts given by each party,
instead of only referring to the gift given by one of the parties.
This ambiguity can cause problems with the understanding of who is
who in an exchange, which is important for the theoretical
considerations which will follow. For instance, concerning an intricately
crafted leather-and-tusk helmet, the narrator tells us that:

Ἀμφιδάμας δὲ Μόλῳ δῶκε ξεινήϊον εἶναι,
αὐτὰρ ὁ Μηριόνῃ δῶκεν ᾧ παιδὶ φορῆναι·
δὴ τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος πύκασεν κάρη ἀμφιτεθεῖσα.
Il. 10.269–271

Amphidamas gave it to Molos to be a guest-gift,
but he gave it to his son, Meriones to wear.
And now, having been put on, it covers closely the head of
Odysseus.
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This passage makes clear that the helmet Odysseus is wearing was once
given as a guest-gift. We are not told, however, whether Amphidamas
is the guest or the host. Although this might seem trivial, knowing the
social standing of the one who gives the gift can allow one to speculate
on the acceptability of certain gifts in various social scenarios. For
instance, just as we have conventions about what is considered an
acceptable (or even expected) gift in certain social situations (e.g. the
convention for a guest to bring wine to the host of an evening party),
could there be a distinguishable convention like this among the elite in
Homeric poetry? Lastly, it is worth briefly noting that a xeinêion need
not be given right away.
There is also no clear answer as to when it is appropriate to give
xeinêia. Although in the first example between Bellerophon and Oineus
the gifts are exchanged conterminously, in a later occurrence (Il. 18.407–
409) we are presented with a scene in which Hephaistos is repaying
Thetis with xeinêia for her hospitality when she raised him after he was
thrown from Olympus.58 This seeming ambivalence towards when one
must give the xeineion suggests that there is a rather loose underlying
structure in the practice of giving guest-gifts.
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Ultimately, both etymologically and in practice, it seems clear that
xeinêion is a noun specific to the situation of a gift being given between
a guest and host, without distinction of it being either a guest’s gift to
his host, or a host’s gift to his guest.

2.2 ADJECTIVES
2.2.1 Kakos
Having discussed the nouns which the poet of the Iliad uses to signify
‘gift’, we will now turn to the adjectives which he employs to qualify
them. Notably, except in one case (Il. 24.528), the adjectives used with
gift terms are never negative in terms of value judgement.59 In light of
there being only a single negative description of a gift, we will first
consider the unique occurrence before analysing the usual positive
descriptions. The sole instance of a negative description of a gift terms
occurs in the final book of the Iliad. In this scene, Priam has covertly
entered into the Greek camp in order to ransom the body of Hektor
from Achilles. In his reply to Priam’s supplication, Achilles begins his
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One might be tempted to argue that the lack of positive qualifying adjective is itself
a negative comment on the gift, however I believe that unless there is an overt negative,
it is impossible to know whether the speaker or narrator believes the gift to be
somehow inappropriate.
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reply with a parable about the nature of suﬀering in which he claims
that:

δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διός οὔδει
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων.
Il. 24.527–528

There are two pithoi laying on Zeus’ floor
of gifts he gives, the one of evils, the other of good things.”

Two things in this passage are important for our study. First is that the
word dôron is used here with the implication that human fate is in some
way a gift, and second, that this gift can sometimes be evil (i.e. woes,
misfortune) itself.60 This usage of dôron serves to illustrate the broad
meaning of the word in the poem. It is important to note that in this
context Achilles is not claiming that the gift Zeus gives is somehow
inappropriate or against the established code of gift giving. Within the
Iliad, then, we have no instance in the poem of a gift being given which
is judged to be inappropriate to the occasion. What this passage does
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We can perhaps see in Achilles’ statement the acknowledgement that everything is
ultimately a gift from the gods, whether it be ‘good’ or bad’, the gods are responsible
for everything including the very existence of humanity (see Godelier 1999: 29–31).
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tell us, however, is that not all gifts are desirable, but the point of the
story is that one must accept whatever fate (gift) the gods mete out.61

2.2.2 AGLAOS
One of the many positive adjectives which often modifies dôron in the
Iliad is aglaos, “an epithet of commendations of somewhat indefinite
meaning,” which can mean approximately ‘splendid’, ‘bright’.62 When
modifying dôron, the adjective only appears in the final two feet of the
line. Aglaos is not only used to describe gifts. The poet uses it a number
of times in other contexts to describe things such as ransom (apoina, e.g.
Il. 1.23; 1.111), persons (e.g. Il. 2.736; 5.283; 10.196; 18.337), or even water
(Il. 2.307). The commonest noun modified by aglaos is huios ‘son’.
From its use alongside such diverse nouns, aglaos cannot be said to
have a strong semantic nuance within the Iliad. When the adjective is
used to refer to a gift, about half of the time it is used to describe
unknown gifts (i.e. when we are not told what the gift is), and in the
rest of its occurrences it refers to diﬀerent types of gifts that share only
a few similarities. The clearest similarity in use comes from the
description of a number of gifts given to Peleus and his son Achilles by
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MacLeod 1982: ad loc. MacLeod contrasts Achilles’ belief that evils can be from the
gods with Plato’s rejection that is this not possible (Rep. 379d).
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Cunliﬀe s.v. aglaos.
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the gods. Peleus’ horses (Il. 16.381) and armour (which is lost to Hektor
by Patroklos; Il. 18.83) as well as Achilles’ new panoply (Il. 18.64;19.18)
are both described as aglaos. Apart from the shared divine origin of the
gifts, though, there seems not to be any unifying factor in the usage of
aglaos.63 Similarly, during Achilles’ speech on human fate, he describes
the gifts given Peleus by the gods (both good and evil) as aglaos (24.534).
Ultimately, the poet seems to use aglaos in context of god-given gifts
most often when the gifts are named. There are, however, instances
where a named gift is described as aglaos but not from a god: Alexander’s
gift of gold to bribe a Trojan to vote against giving Helen back (Il. 11.124)
and the mules Priam had received from the Mysians (Il. 24.278). These
occurrences suggest that aglaos is not used in specific contexts of gift
giving but is instead a generally applicable positive adjective applied to
a number of diﬀerent things.

2.2.3 Axios
The adjective axios, meaning ‘suﬃcient’, ‘suitable’, ‘worthy’, has the
implication of oﬀering a value judgement on the gift it describes. By
looking at the gifts so described, we might be able to learn what the poet
or characters consider to be a suitable gift in certain circumstances.
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Although, as we saw above (n.55), all things can be conceived as a gift from the gods.
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Problematically, however, the poem provides us with merely two
instances of axios as a descriptor of a gift.
During the Embassy episode, Odysseus uses the adjective axios to
describe the gifts Agamemnon is oﬀering in order to persuade Achilles
to lay aside his anger.64 The social context of this use of axios, however,
aﬀects the way we interpret the meaning. This scene is filled with
instances of careful word-choice when the characters speak of the gifts
Agamemnon will oﬀer. Odysseus, as Donna Wilson points out, knows
that what Agamemnon has said is not what Achilles wants to hear. Just
as he leaves a few lines out during his otherwise verbatim delivery of
Agamemnon’s oﬀer, Odysseus chooses to describe the gifts as axia in an
attempt to help persuade Achilles that what he is being oﬀered is fair,
even if Agamemnon is oﬀering the wrong type of compensation.65
Although this scene does not present a typical instance of gift giving,
due to the incredible number of gifts being oﬀered, the use of axios
makes it clear that the gifts being oﬀered are thought of as suitable at
least by Odysseus.
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This fits well with Mauss’ belief that the gift is never disinterested. Some theoretical
frameworks for gifts (e.g. Derrida 1992: 1–33), however, argue that a gift must be
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something within the economy of a society. This is a matter of anachronism: for as
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The second usage of axios demonstrates that this adjective is also used
to mean ‘suitable’ in a more typical social situation. During the funeral
games of Patroklos, Achilles proposes to give Meriones second prize,
even though he finished last (Il. 23.536–538). This proposal, although met
with unanimous approval from the spectators (Il. 23.539 “οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα
πάντες ἐπῄνεον ὡς ἐκέλυε”),66 is challenged by Antilochos, who placed
second in the race (Il. 23.543–554). To Antilochos’ complaint, Achilles
replies:

Ἀντίλοχ᾽, εἰ μὲν δή με κελεύεις οἴκοθεν ἄλλο
Εὐμήλῳ ἐπιδοῦναι, ἐγὼ δέ κε καὶ τὸ τελέσσω.
δώσω οἱ θώρῃκα, τὸν Ἀσττεροπαῖον ἀπηύρων,
χάλκεον, ᾧ πέρι χεῦμα φαεινοῦ κασσιτέροιο
ἀμφιδεδείνηται· πολέος δέ οἱ ἄξιος ἔσται.
Il. 23.558–562

“Antilochos, if you bid me to give something else
from my house to Eumelos, I will do it.
I will give him the bronze breastplate, taken from
Asteropaios, around which a plating of shining tin
runs. It will be of great worth for him.”
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It is interesting to note that Achilles nearly commits the same folly as Agamemnon
in Book 1 which gave way to Achilles’ anger: Achilles intends here to strip the rightful
recipient of their due prize.
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This passage provides us with a much more typical gift giving scenario:
a single gift is given to a dear friend for his eﬀorts during a race.
Although the two uses of axios to modify a gift occur in diﬀerent
circumstances, there is still a strong unifying link between both uses. In
both instances, the person describing the gift is one who is trying to
assuage a slight to another’s honour. Odysseus describes Agamemnon’s
oﬀered gifts as axia perhaps not because he truly believes them to be
suitable, but in an attempt to persuade Achilles to accept them.
Similarly, when Achilles decides to give Meriones a bronze breastplate,
he too is trying to assuage the recipient’s slighted honour.67 Thus, when
a gift is described as axios, it is perhaps not necessarily a commentary on
the gift itself, but a persuasive technique. Indeed, as the only two uses
of axios to describe a gift occur in ring composition, the poetic qualities
of the adjective should be stressed more than the theoretical implications
it may have on gift giving as a practice.
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On the pre-determined pacing of the participants in the Funeral Games episode, see
Stocking (forthcoming).
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2.3 VERBS
2.3.1 DIDÔMI
Didômi is the commonest verb employed for the giving of gifts in the
Iliad. As mentioned above, in the overwhelming majority of instances
where a character in the Iliad gives a gift, the text uses at least one reflex
of PIE *deh3-ro-, and often both the verb and the noun will be from that
same root. Of course, didômi is used in a number of diﬀerent situations,
not just in the giving of what we might consider a gift. For example,
Diomedes gives his horse to a lackey to take back to camp (Il. 5.26).
When used with gifts, didômi is used with gifts that are not only
corporeal, one might give something incorporeal: Zeus gives pains to
Agamemnon (Il. 2.375 alge’ edoken), the gods give to Hektor the art of
warcraft and to other men, diﬀerent skills (Il. 13.727–734).
In addition to lacking any specificity in regard to what one may give,
didômi is also unspecific in regard to who can give and to whom. There
are numerous instances of men giving to men (e.g. Il. 7.299), men giving
to gods (e.g. 20.299), gods giving to men (e.g. 16.381), and gods giving
to gods (e.g. Il. 14.238). Like dôron above, didômi furnishes a number of
examples for us to examine theoretically and practically in our
formulation of a system of giving in the Iliad.
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2.3.2 DEKHOMAI
It is also important to examine the instance of the use of dekhomai ‘to
receive,’ ‘accept’. As Mauss writes in his Essai sur le don, “Refuser de
donner, négliger d’inviter, comme refuser de prendre, équivaut à declarer
la guerre ; c’est refuser l’alliance et la communion.”68 Indeed, where
characters do accept gifts (or something given them), it is described as
something done “rejoicing” (e.g. Il. 23.647 “τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐγὼ πρόφρων
δέχομαι, χαίρει δε μοι ἦτορ,” “I accept it cheerfully, and my heart
rejoices”; Il 23.797 “ὅ δ᾽ ἐδέξατο χαίρων” “rejoicing, he accepted it”). In
the Iliad, to refuse a gift oﬀered is a transgression. If a gift is refused, the
social bond between giver and would-be recipient is destroyed. Indeed,
the Iliad begins with Agamemnon rejecting an oﬀer from the Trojan
priest Chryses, who is trying to ransom his daughter from Agamemnon.
The consequences of a rejected gift are not easily reversed. In the
Iliad, we see that after a gift has been rejected, it is likely that the gift
will no longer be given, should the one who rejected it later change his
mind. For instance, Agamemnon loses out on the ransom he would have
received should he have accepted (Il. 1.98-99). Further evidence of this
is found in the moral story Phoenix relates to Achilles in Book 9, when
Agamemnon is oﬀering to Achilles a plethora of gifts (Il. 9.598–599).
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Indeed, the rejection of an oﬀering can be seen as a dishonour done unto
the one who has oﬀered (Il. 1.94).

2.4 PHILOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS
Although Benveniste’s method of attempting to tease out nuances in
meaning between the numerous Greek words for ‘gift’ which appear in
the Homeric epics is in some ways a helpful tool, I believe that the
underlying principles of his study are problematic. Many of the nouns
he endows with narrow meanings occur only once or twice, and do not
permit a thorough comparative analysis. Even when we consider the
words outside of their Homeric context in later literature, we find that
this specificity does not obtain. If there were some emerging specificity
developing in the Homeric language, we would have expected that this
specificity be more pronounced in the later authors.
The approach of assigning nouns to specific types of gift giving takes
for granted that there is such a specific structural system of gift giving in
operation in the Iliad, and I have shown that, both etymologically and
contextually, there is very little support for gift terms being
representative of a system of gift giving which diﬀerentiates types of gifts
by vocabulary. Instead of using this structuralist approach, I believe that
we must approach the terms from a more poetic point-of-view. For
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instance, the Russian Formalist Viktor Slovskij’s ideas of linguistic
automation and John Miles Foley’s theory of traditional referentiality
are helpful here. Slovskij’s approach to poetic language argues that
“poetical language acts against automatization,” the variant language
used serves as a means by which the poet may attract the attention of
the audience away from the banal language of the every-day.69 Similarly,
John Miles Foley’s theory of traditional referentiality argues that the oral
poet’s use of certain words and scenes can evoke in the mind of the
audience an entire mythic association.70 Such marked uses of gift terms
may then serve as a means by which the poet is able to draw the
audience’s attention to the scene.
Ultimately, the uses of the gift giving nouns do not support
understanding them as words connected with specific structuralist types
of gift giving. Rather, the words themselves I believe to be important
for their being diﬀerent. With the exception of the specific xeineion, the
gift terms serve largely as synonyms of the banal dôron.
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2
PRACTICE & THEORY

I

n the previous chapter I showed that an approach which relies on
vocabulary with the aim of discerning an underlying system of gift
giving is problematic—namely, the approach presupposes that the

Greeks had a conscious distinction and that this distinction is manifest
in the language of the poetic tradition. Although this conjecture is not
supported by the textual evidence, the basic idea, viz. paying close
attention to the language used in scenes involving gift giving is
profitable. By examining the passages which include gift terms, and
those which do not, we find that the use of these terms lacks a
universality which can be fully explained by sociological theories of gift
giving.
First, we will look at the current theoretical conceptions of gift
giving, arguing ultimately that these ideas cannot be applied to the Iliad,
without either modifying theory or text. Following this theoretical
discussion, we will take examples from the Iliad in order to illustrate that
the use (or avoidance) of gift giving language in certain scenes is
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meaningful. In these readings, we cannot unproblematically apply a
universalising theory to the text.71 We will also see that gift terms are
used throughout the poem to describe exchanges which are far from
freely given or distinct from other forms of giving, which I believe
requires that we be attendant to the language used in the scenes which
involve (or do not involve) gift terms. That gift terms are being used in
situations identified by narrator or character as not being freely given is
important. Conceptions of gift giving revolve around the true or feigned
nature of a gift being given freely.
Gifts are things that are given freely, voluntarily. In English, this is
axiomatic, the word ‘gift’ is defined as “a thing given willingly to
someone without payment; a present.”72 As Mauss notes, however, this
is a theoretical pretension which does not obtain in reality.73 Gifts are
economic, but participants must suspend their belief that this is the case.
Bourdieu writes that:
gift exchange is one of the social games which cannot be played
unless the players refuse to acknowledge the objective truth of
the game, the very truth that objective analysis brings to light,
and unless they are predisposed to contribute, with their eﬀorts,
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their marks of care and attention, and their time, to the
production of collective misrecognition.74

Similarly, Derrida writes that “the simple identification of a gift seems
to destroy it.”75 These three theorists all hit upon the same idea:
participants in gift giving must be able to suspend their belief that their
actions are in actuality economic. As we will see in the analysis of
passages below, this need to misrecognise economic transactions is
missing from the Homeric instances of exchange.
As we saw in Chapter 1, attempts to divide gifts up based on language
is generally problematic. Even the category of xeinêia is problematic in
that there are some clear instances of gifts between people bound by
xenia which are not called a xeineion. The exchange between Diomedes
and Glaukos (which will be discussed at length in the following chapter)
is an instance of this. So too are other forms of division. Indeed, when
we try to divide gifts up by diﬀerent criteria, we quickly learn that there
are exceptions or overlap. Instead, this chapter will begin with a
discussion of modern gift giving theory, showing how there are
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problems in the text which do not allow for these theories to be applied
to the Iliad. Following this, I will introduce and compare a number of
gift giving instances from the Iliad in order to illustrate that not only do
modern theories fail to explain entirely the instances of gift terms, but
also that the use of gift terms throughout the Iliad appears to be
unsystematic. In many cases, for example, something described as a gift
in one instance will be described as a part of economic exchange in
another analogous scene. Furthermore, characters will sometimes cease
to consider something a gift abruptly.

2.1 THEORY
As we saw above, gift theory began with the publication of Mauss’ “Essai
sur le don” in 1924–25.76 In his work, Mauss advanced the idea that no
gift is disinterested, that is to say, no gift, regardless of what the
participants believe, is given for free. For Mauss, gifts are a part of a
system of total prestation, in which collectives exchange much more
than simply moveable wealth. Mauss argues that “prestations and
counterprestations are entered into somewhat more voluntarily, by way
of presents (cadeaux), although ultimately they are strictly compulsory,
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on pain of private or public war.”77 In eﬀect, Mauss believes that
anything in a society can be exchanged: from ranks, to persons, to
traditional moveable goods, and all of these things are interrelated.
According to Marshall Sahlins and David Graeber, Mauss seems to
believe that the gift was a form of Hobbesian social contract, one which
served ‘pre-political’ societies, stopping them from all-out war with one
another.78 This is challenged by Graeber, however, who says that there
is “no explanation of why members of diﬀerent ‘clans, tribes, and
families’ should feel inclined to kill each other in the first place.”79
Perhaps Mauss’ most famous (and most criticized) theoretical
conjecture is that of the hau, a concept he developed from his
interpretation of an explanation given by Tamati Ranaipiri, a Maori:
I will now speak of the hau… The hau is not the hau that
blows—not at all. I will carefully explain to you. Suppose that
you possess a certain article, and you give that article to me,
without price. We make no bargain over it. Now. I give that
article to a third person, who, after some time has elapsed,
decides to make some return for it (utu), and so he makes me a
present of some article (taonga). Now, that article (taonga) that
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he gives to me is the hau of the article I first received from you
and then gave to him. The goods (taonga) that I received for
that item I must hand over to you. It would not be right for me
to keep such goods for myself, whether they be desirable (rawe)
items or otherwise (kino). I must hand that item over to you,
because they are a hau of the article (taonga) you gave me. Were
I to keep such equivalent for myself, then some serious evil
would befall me, even death. Such is the hau, the hau of
personal property, or the forest hau.80

Mauss, in need of an explanation for why gifts must be reciprocated,
appealed to the Maori concept of hau, which he interpreted as a sort of
spirit of the thing given: a force with which the thing given is imbued
and which compels a return to its original owner.81 The latter claim has
been subjected to criticism from not long after it appeared. Claude LeviStrauss, for example, has criticized Mauss’ methodological approach:
“Mauss strives to reconstruct a whole out of parts; and as that is
manifestly not possible, he has to add to the mixture an additional
quantity which gives him the illusion of squaring the account. This
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quantity is the hau.”82 Levi-Strauss here is arguing that, because Mauss
had isolated three parts of the exchange: giving, receiving, and
reciprocation, Mauss was in need of something to make reciprocation
necessary, for otherwise, it would seem to be irrelevant to the account
he had put forward. Why does one need to reciprocate? What has
happened in Mauss’ case is that he has fallen victim to “the explanatory
value of Polynesian beliefs.”83 Mauss has taken the reason given by the
Polynesians as a universal explanation, rather than as merely the reason
in which the Polynesians believe.
Mauss’ interpretation of the hau is also called into question by
Marshall Sahlins in his Stone Age Economy, where he shows that Mauss
misunderstands the Ranaipiri text. Sahlins argues that “the Maori was
trying to explain a religious concept by an economic principle, which
Mauss promptly understood the other way around.”84 The exchange of
goods which Ranaipiri was attempting to describe was completely
secular: “The meaning of hau one disengages from the exchange of
taonga is as secular as the exchange itself.”85 The idea which was being
illustrated by the example of the Ranaipiri text, Sahlins suggests, is the
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unacceptability of profiting from the gift of another. The hau is best
understood as that very profit, which must be yielded to the original
giver.86 This idea of hau, whether we follow Mauss’ or Sahlins’
interpretation of it is not found in the Iliad; we do not read of any such
exchange which matches this Maori example. Gifts in the Iliad are given
without the imperative from an underlying force.
The idea that there resides in an object the ‘spirit’ of the previous
owner(s), however, is not completely alien to the Iliad. As Lilah Grace
Canevaro argues, a ‘spirit’ of the past possessor(s) resides in epic objects,
creating a biography which is largely made up of past owners and the
maker of the item.87 As she notes, however, this is predominantly related
to male objects, which are retrospective, in contrast to female objects
which are proleptic: “that is to say that male objects evoke stories from
the past, giving the object potency in the present, whereas women’s
objects—and the women themselves—are focused less on recalling the
past in the present and more on perpetuating memory of the present in
the future.”88 Although the objects in epic seem to, in a way, retain a
part of their former owner, the connection with the hau is problematic.
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To begin, this connection to previous owners is not agentic: it does not
compel the current possessor to reciprocate, it serves more as a means of
memorialisation. Because this feature of memorialisation is limited to
certain gifts only, it lacks a universality needed in a structuralist account
of gift giving.89
We might here also briefly consider some of Bourdieu’s thoughts on
giving. What is most important for me here is Bourdieu’s focus on time,
something which is present in Mauss’ work on the Maori, which was
not used as much as it could have been.90 Bourdieu’s argument is that
the act of giving is one which occupies time, and the analysis of the
practice must take into account that time, for indeed time is even itself
a part of the exchange, whereby parties may display inferiority or
superiority by the intentional use of time in reciprocation.91 Indeed, in
the Iliad, we see heroes immediately reciprocate gifts, or else see only a
single instant of a gift giving process. For example, we read that Kinyras
has given to Agamemnon a corselet on account of the Trojan War (Il.
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11.20). This passage illustrates the problematic nature of analysing gift
giving in the text: we lose out on the entire temporal aspect of this
instance. The examples of gift giving in the Iliad are all detotalized; we
do not have access to the entire practice, but only a small part of it. As
we have seen above, in order to fully appreciate and evaluate gift giving,
we must have more than merely the instance of giving, for that action is
only a small part of the entire practice.

3.2 GIFTS
Categorising gifts in the Iliad is problematic. Not only are there myriad
ways of categorising gifts, it is not always clear what exactly a gift being
given is. Many instances of dôron do not tell us what is being given as a
gift (e.g. Il. 1.213, 230; 9.113; 18.408; 24.77). One possibility of categorising
is to classify the gift as relating to the martial or domestic sphere. The
problems we run into when trying to categorise gifts as ‘martial’ or
‘domestic’ are that a gift itself may be related to one of these two social
spheres but given in a diﬀerent sphere (e.g. Il. 6.215–219, which narrates
a domestic scene in which a martial item is given), or else, we might run
into the problem of groups being too encompassing or too restrictive to
be of any use at all. The best option for categorising gifts is to base the
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categories on donor, where mortals and immortals have distinct gifts.92
There is a marked distinction between what mortals give and what
immortals give: the gods are able to give divine items such as immortal
horses (Il. 16.381, 867). This section will read some scenes of gift giving
from the Iliad which are clearly marked by the use of a gift term, but
which pose problems for a straightforward interpretation of gift giving
in the epic.
There are a small number of martial gifts which are given throughout
the Iliad, which are either weapons or armour. Gifts of weapons consist
of swords (Il. 7.307; 10.255; 23.807), spears (Il. 23.896–897), and a bow
given by Apollo (Il. 2.827). Gifts of armour consist of war-belts (Il. 6.219;
7.305), helmets (Il. 10.268–270), corselets (Il. 11.20, 23; 15.532; 23.560), and
a shield (Il. 10.255), and full panoplies (Il. 18.82, 85; 19.366). Not all of
these are explicitly called a gift. Indeed, when we consider which of these
are clearly marked as gifts, our list shrinks substantially: only two belts
(Il. 6.219, 7.305), one sword (Il. 7.305), one helmet (Il. 10.268), one
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corselet (Il. 11.20), and two sets of full armour (18.83, 19.367) are described
as gifts.93
What is remarkable about these gifts is that not all are brought about
by the same catalyst: and indeed, when we compare other gifts given
which are brought about by the same catalyst (e.g. guest-host
interaction, athletic prizes), we find that diﬀerent types of gifts are given
sometimes in the same interaction. For instance, the two occurrences of
a war-belt (zôstêr) being given are markedly diﬀerent. On the one hand,
we have the episode between Oineus and Bellerophon, narrated by
Diomedes:

οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά·
Οἰνεὺς μὲν ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν…
Il. 6.218–219

And they gave each other beautiful guest-gifts:
Oineus gave a shining-red war-belt…

Notably, this gift was brought about because Oineus hosted
Bellerophon for twenty days. These specific gifts are seemingly irrelevant
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When Achilles fights in the armour Hephaistos makes him, individual pieces of the
full panoply are said to be a gift of the god (e.g. Il. 20.265, 268; 21.165, 594). Because
these are part of the set given, I choose not to count each piece as an individual gift.
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to the narrative of the poem.94 In another instance we have a zôstêr being
exchanged at the end of combat: Hektor gives to Aias a silver-studded
sword, and Aias gives to Hektor a shining-red war-belt (Il. 7.303–305).
The catalyst for this exchange was the setting of the sun, causing them
to put oﬀ their heart-consuming strife (eridos thumoboroio, Il. 7.301). The
narrative of the poem, perhaps, complicates this gift. For the belt given
by Aias, in spirit of their new friendship and end of hatred, is perhaps
then used by Achilles to tie Hektor’s corpse to his chariot in his attempt
to defile the body (Il 22.396–400).95 The belt, once a symbol of
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It is remarked (Gaisser 1969: 175) that from a narrative perspective these gifts allow
for ring composition culminating in the exchange between Diomedes and Glaukos.
This will be discussed below when the episode between Diomedes and Glaukos is given
a thorough analysis.
95
The idea of the belt itself being used is recorded in Sophocles’ Ajax 1029–1031. de
Jong (2012: ad loc.) and Finglass (2012: 431) comment that Homer may have supressed
the version in which Hektor was dragged while alive. Cf. Soph. Ajax 1030–1031.
This reading of the defilement of the corpse is problematic. The passage in Soph.
Ajax (1028–1039) from which the idea seems to originate is considered an
interpolation by some (e.g. Finglass 2011: ad loc). He writes that the use of the belt to
tie Hektor to the chariot “is not attested for a millennium (Leontius Scholasticus A.P.
7.151, 7.152), and is probably an innovation for this passage (thus West (1978) 117):
such a detail is only relevant within the confines of this rhetorical juxtaposition.”
Furthermore, the scholia on the Iliad do not seem to mention that the leather with
which Hektor was tied was the belt given him by Aias. West (1978:117) seems to
believe that the passage is legitimate but is not strongly attached to the idea that the
use of the belt is original: “the identification of this ligature with the belt which Ajax
once gave Hektor in exchange for a sword (Il. 7.303ﬀ.) may be an innovation [emphasis
mine].” Jebb (1896: 235) suggests that the idea was an allusion to an earlier poem,
“possibly in the Aitheopis or the Little Iliad. In any case, it is evident that the account
of Hektor’s death adopted by Sophocles cannot be regarded as his own invention ; his
manner of referring to it clearly implies another source.” If we are to follow Jebb, we
can assume that this tradition of the use of the belt given by Aias was in circulation at
an early date.
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friendship, is made to illustrate the opposite feeling: Achilles’ hatred of
Hektor. In the same vein, the suicide of Ajax using the sword of Hektor
is more established in the tradition: Alex Purves writes that “there is a
suggestion in the Iliad that each of his appearances is backlit by our
awareness of his approaching suicide.”96 West, following Jebb, suggests
that’s the tradition of Aias’ suicide by Hektor’s gift was present in the
Epic Cycle.97
We may also take a moment here to bring to light the diﬀerence
between this gift and the one between Oineus and Bellerophon: while
the latter still exerts pressure on Diomedes and Glaukos not to fight, the
gifts given between Aias and Hektor do not incur a long-lasting bond
between the two: we find them once again in combat with one another
later in the poem (e.g. Il. 13.188–194; 14.402–408; 18.155–158). It seems,

If Homer did indeed suppress the scene of Hektor being dragged alive as too
grotesque for the poem, it raises an interesting problem related to speech acts, for
Homer certainly includes speeches which suggest especially heinous treatment of
bodies. I am thinking specifically of Achilles’ threat to eat Hektor’s flesh raw (Il.
22.346–347). The lines draw out the diﬀerence between a speech act and an act itself:
it would seem that the speech act is seen as a lesser oﬀence than committing the act
itself, that the desire to descend from humanity is acceptable (as poetic material, not
as popular morality).
On the topic of abusing bodies, see, e.g. Vernant 1991.
96
Purves 2015: 83.
97
West 1978: 117; Jebb 1896: 235
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then, that the gift is not a reliable method of creating a lasting social
bond between two persons.98
One final example will serve to illustrate the diversity of situations in
which characters in the Iliad give gifts of a military nature: Achilles’
armour, which Patroklos will wear on his doomed attempt to boost
Greek morale, was originally given as a wedding present:
… τεύχεα δ᾽ Ἕκτωρ
δῃώσας ἀπέδυσε πελώρια, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι,
καλά· τὰ μὲν Πηλῆϊ θεοὶ ἀφλαὰ δῶρα
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σε βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἔμβαλον εὐνῇ.
Il. 18.82–85

And Hektor, having killed
him, stripped the mighty armour, a wonder to look at,
and beautiful: which the gods gave to Peleus as a splendid gift
on that day when they threw you to the marriage
bed of a mortal man.

These instances illustrate that martial gifts are not confined only to
the context of war. Certainly, gifts given in times of war are martial, but
there is not much option otherwise, unless perhaps one of the
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See Mueller 2015: 24–25 on Hektor’s linguistic manipulation of the exchange and
the gifts’ place not in a lasting friendship but as “a placeholder[s] for future conflict”
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participants in the gift giving happened to be carrying with him a cup
or other non-martial item.
Focusing now on domestic gifts, we notice first of all a distinctly
smaller number of gifts given are of a domestic nature. The first instance
belongs to the exchange between Oineus and Bellerophon. In return for
the war-belt given him, Bellerophon gives to Oineus a golden doublecup (Il. 6.220). As another example we have a bowl given by the
Phoenicians to Thoas (Il. 23.745). As a final example we might add the
robe Hekabê took as a gift to Athene (Il. 6.293). This imbalance of gifts
can be understood in a number of ways. First, we might explain it by
appealing to the nature of the poem: the Iliad largely deals with war, and
as such the social interactions which result in a domestic gift being given
are, by necessity, underrepresented in the poem.
About these corporeal gifts, Donlan writes,

“Gift giving among the Homeric elite…has maximum social
and political purpose, but little economic purpose… All oﬀers,
acceptances, or exchanges of dôra are instrumental, either in
establishing, maintaining, or repairing a relationship, or in
minimising hostility, or validating or calibrating (and even
creating) diﬀerences in rank.”99
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Donlan 1997: 663.
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This assertion is essentially Maussian: there is no disinterested gift.
Problematically, however, the text with which we must work does not
oﬀer explicit commentary on gift giving: none of our textual evidence
seems to indicate social dynamics in giving at a level more direct than
observer, nor can we accurately determine the value of a gift (is a gold
cup worth more than a dyed belt, a silver-studded sword?). Donlan
continues by writing that, “the emphasis on competition and display in
Homeric gift giving might seem exaggerated, had we not numerous
parallels from big-man and chieftain societies world-wide.”100 Again, I
argue, Donlan runs into problems. His assertion that competition is
exaggerated in Homer lacks textual support: where do we read any
notion of competitiveness in giving? Most, if not all gifts given in the
Iliad are written without agonistic elements. One might argue that
Agamemnon’s oﬀer in Book 9 and Priam’s ransom for Hektor, are guilty
of being competitive, but these are isolated cases: no other characters
oﬀer such gifts as these. If this emphasis is present in the Odyssey, it
serves as an illustration of why a study of gift giving in Homer must
necessarily take each text as separate: for what may be present in one of
the texts is absent from the other, leaving a universalising conclusion
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Donlan 1997: 663.
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impossible. Secondly, Donlan’s limiting term is dôra, which does not
cover all instances of gift giving in the Iliad: xeineion, for example, are
perfectly valid gifts to include, especially since they are specific to certain
situations. And indeed, many scholars will include as gifts those scenes
which lack any gift term at all, and these will be examined in the
following section.
Especially interesting for our discussion here is the use of dôra to
describe some of the items oﬀered by Agamemnon to Achilles, to which
we will now turn, advancing the argument that since gift terms are used
in situations where the thing given is clearly not a gift (i.e. a freely given
thing, either truly or only imagined by the participants and/or
observers), the use of gift terms must serve an aesthetic purpose.
Throughout the Iliad, no fewer than nineteen (out of a total of seventythree) instances of gift terms are used refer specifically to parts of
Agamemnon’s long list of ‘gifts’ which he wishes to oﬀer Achilles.101 As
Donna Wilson has argued, the Embassy scene of Book 9 is highly
dependent on the use of the words apoina and poinê; Agamemnon
consciously “deploys none of the language typically associated with
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The count of seventy-three instances of gift terms includes the words dôron, dosis,
and xeineion
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poinê,” and instead chooses to use the word apoina in order to frame the
oﬀerings in a certain way.102 Indeed, as she writes later,

Perhaps most telling, oﬀers of apoina conventionally
presuppose a situation of hostility; apoina are never in the
discrete themes exchanged between philoi. By oﬀering apoina
to Achilleus, Agamemnon casts him in the thematic role of the
enemy.103

This apoina, however, is referred to as a dôra by Agamemnon,
Nestor, Odysseus, and Achilles (Il. 9.121, 164, 261, 378
respectively).104 This seems to me to show one of two things (or even
both). On the one hand, if we are to take Wilson’s analysis of the
diﬀerence between apoina and poinê, it would seem that a gift is
equal to apoina. And this is not the only case in the poem where
this seems to be the case: when Priam is gathering gifts (dôra; e.g.
Il. 24.77, 119, 176) to bring to Achilles, these gifts are specifically
thought of as a ransom (apoina; e.g. Il. 24.555, 579) for Hektor.105
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Wilson 2002: 76.
Wilson 2002: 78.
104
Lattimore translates axia dôra (Il. 9.261) as ‘worthy recompense’, illustrating the
desire to economise the gift.
105
Up until Priam actually meets with Achilles, Priam refers to the things gathered as
dôra (and indeed, when Zeus himself sets this plan in motion, he refers to the things
Priam will oﬀer to Achilles as gifts). Once Priam is in the presence of Achilles,
however, he abandons the use of gift terms in order to employ the word apoina.
103
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What this would mean, I believe, is that a gift is not freely given,
for apoina are, by definition, not something that is freely given. The
specific uses of the gift term, especially in Priam’s ransom of
Hektor’s body, seem to suggest, however, that the use of the gift
terms is highly meaningful. The context in the two ransom scenes
seems to elicit a certain important distinction. On the one hand,
Agamemnon and the others choose to call his oﬀerings ‘gifts’ in
order to conceal (ineﬀectually) the true nature of his oﬀer, while
Priam seems to switch away from using it to Achilles in order to
express proper deference and etiquette given the situation.
It seems to me, then, that the category of ‘gift’ in the Iliad is
more complicated than a reductionist political analysis would
allow—the language of the gift giving scenes must be important
in the understanding of the scene, and this transference between
dôra and apoina illustrates that the gift in the epic is not
understood as simply something perceived as freely-given.106
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This equation of gifts with another form of non-gift is investigated in Newton 2009,
where he compares the geras with the guest-gift in an inter-poetic analysis between
both of the Homeric epics, showing that such a transference was an oral-traditional
feature that “allow[ed] the poet compositional flexibility.” If Newton is right, this
flexibility poses a problem for interpretations of Homeric gift giving as fully-formed
social practices: essentially, if they are used as synonyms of other overtly economic
modes of exchange, it might be nearly impossible to distinguish gifts from non-gifts.
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3.2.3 THINGS GIVEN
Following the logic of the previous section, we will now turn to
exchanges which do not use a gift term in their description of the thing
given, but which can still benefit from being read when attentive to the
language of the scene.
The first instance of a definite object being given in the Iliad (2.102107) is a genealogical account of how Agamemnon came to possess his
sceptre which gives him power over the other Greeks. The poet traces
its origins from Zeus, who gave it to Hermes, who then gave it to
Pelops, from whom it was passed down within the family. In each case
except two the verb didômi is used to signify the passing of the sceptre.
The verb first changes when the sceptre goes from Atreus to Thyestes.
Instead of the so-far customary didômi, the poet switches to the verb
leipô ‘to leave’: Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνῄσκων ἔλιπεν πολύαρνι Θυέστῃ, “And
Atreus, dying, left it to lamb-rich Thyestes” (Il. 2.106). In the following
line the verb remains leipô: αὐτὰρ ὁ αὖτε Θυέστ᾽ Ἀγαμέμνονι λεῖπε
φορῆναι…, “And moreover, Thyestes left it to Agamemnon to carry…”
(Il. 2.107). In this change of verb, we can detect a subtle hint that the
sceptre has gone from a willing gift to an unwilling one. One has to look
no further than the mythical history of this family to see that between
Atreus and Pelops it is unlikely that a gift of such power (the
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consequence of the sceptre seems to be the right to rule the Greeks
widely, Il. 2.108) would willingly be given from Atreus to Thyestes or
from Thyestes to the sons of Atreus.107 This idea of the scepter being
given unwillingly has not gone unnoticed: a scholiast comments, “τὸ μὲν
γὰρ δῶκε φιλίας τεκμήριον φησι, τὸ δὲ καταλειπεῖν ἀνάγκης” (for he
[Homer] says ‘gave’ as a sign of friendship, but ‘left behind’ as a sign of
necessity).108 It can be no coincidence that the verb changes from one
with active tones to one which is passive at precisely the moment of
familial conflict.109
What are we to make of the scholiast’s comment on the distinction
between friendly giving and giving out of necessity? It is true that in
these lines the distinction between willingly giving something and
unwillingly leaving something to another is made clear through word
choice. This distinction, however, does not necessarily hold for the rest
of the poem. Agamemnon’s returning of Chryseis illustrates this point.
Although Agamemnon uses the verb didômi, the giving back of Chyseis,
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On the implications of this unwilling bequeathal of Agamemnon’s right to rule the
Greeks, see Stocking (forthcoming).
108
Σ ad loc. The scholiast misquotes the text in his exegesis, for in our version of Homer
we have the non-prefixed form leipô where the scholiast uses a prefixed version.
109
Unfortunately, there are no instances in the Iliad which use leipô to designate a gift
which is left to another, although there are a number of instances of the incorporeal
being left to someone: ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα λελείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρά (“the greatest mournful
pains have been left to me [Priam]”, Il. 24.746). These usages, however, do not oﬀer us
a suitable comparison.
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which is only brought about by necessity, is not one which can be
described as friendly (Il. 1.116). Furthermore, during scenes of ransom,
characters make use of that very word, which is supposed to imply
friendliness or willingness, neither of which is present in such a
situation: the parents are bound by necessity to give ransom (most
famously at Il. 24.594, where Achilleus comments that Priam gave him
worthy ransom for the body of Hektor, but also at Il. 1.95; 9.120; 19.138;
24.686). How can the account Mauss and Donlan put forward be
squared to this example?

3.2.4 MISCELLANEOUS
We can also briefly consider here the formulaic refrain “καὶ ὕπνου
δῶρον ἕλοντο” (Il. 7.482, 9.713; Od. 16.481, 19.427: and they took the gift
of sleep), which appears twice each in the Iliad and Odyssey. This
adnominal genitive is itself not as problematic,110 but the idea of sleep as
something taken is. In Homer (and elsewhere), sleep is something with
its own agency: it is what compels both man and god to sleep (e.g. Il.
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The use of the adnominal genitive has been used as evidence both for and against
the interpolation of the end of Sophocles’ O.T. See e.g. Dawe 2001: 6–7; Kovacs 2009:
56. See Nussbaum 1998: 126–127 for the view that the adnominal genitive was a late
feature of the Homeric Kunstsprache.
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2.2, 2.24, 10.4, 22.502; Od. 5.472, 7.286, 15.7).111 Not only is this refrain the
only instance of sleep not showing agency in Homer, we also have here
the only instance of a gift being taken by someone in the Iliad. In the
Odyssey, however, apart from the two refrains cited above, Odysseus says

σὺ δέ με προΐεις καὶ πότνια μήτηρ
ἐς πατέρ’ Αὐτόλυκον μητρὸς φίλον, ὄφρ’ ἂν ἑλοίμην
δῶρα, τὰ δεῦρο μολών μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν.
Od. 24.333–335

“You and [my] mistress mother sent me
to Autolykos, mother’s dear father, so that I might take112
the gifts, which, having come here, he promised to me.”

In these examples, what is striking is the claim that gifts will be taken,
something which goes against the very nature of a gift as something
given.
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Although I am using neuter pronouns in this section, it should be mentioned that
sleep is also personified as Hypnos, a god (as in Il. 14.233 where Hera appeals to him
directly).
112
Lattimore (2007: ad loc) renders this verb, aireô in Greek, as “so that I could be
given”, though the verb, even in the middle voice, does not reflect the action of ‘being
given’.
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3.3 CONCLUSION
In this section I have aimed to show that major theories of gift exchange
do not perfectly fit the instances of gift giving in the Iliad. Furthermore,
the lack of consistency throughout the Iliad in diﬀerentiating a gift from
other forms of economic exchange causes problems for the rigid
structuralist approaches that these theories require, and the examples
with which we must work oﬀer only a small instance of a durational
practice between donor and recipient, which does not allow us to read
the entire practice as is necessary. Furthermore, because there are so few
instances of individual gifts in the poem, creating an accurate, universal
theory of gift giving is impossible.
Instead, I argued that we should be attentive to the use or avoidance
of gift terms in scenes of exchange. Reading scenes in this way can allow
for new readings of gift giving scenes. This approach was illustrated by
consideration of two major scenes of ransom which both feature the
word dôron throughout, even though the oﬀerings are clearly not what
can be considered gifts. Furthermore, as the passing of the Atreid family
scepter illustrates, reading scenes without gift terms in the same way is
profitable—even the use of a diﬀerent verb can signal the change in
mood of a gift exchange. In these ways, our readings of these scenes
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extend beyond the social, political, or economic realms—the use of gift
giving can serve a poetical purpose.
In the following chapter, I will use this method of analysis in a
focused case study in order to illustrate the benefits of reading gift giving
scenes while being attendant to the language of the poem.
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3
THE DIOMEDES & GLAUKOS EXCHANGE

I

n the previous chapters, I showed that reading gift giving scenes
from an aesthetic point of view can oﬀer profitable readings
beyond or in addition to the reductive political readings of the

scenes. In this final chapter, I aim to provide a detailed aesthetic reading
of a single scene from the Iliad to show the benefits of this approach.

In Book 6 of the Iliad (119–236) there occurs a scene of great importance
for our discussion. At the end of Diomedes’ aristeia, the Lykian warrior
Glaukos comes forward to challenge him in single combat. What ensues
is a scene of recognition during which, on account of the genealogy
oﬀered by Glaukos, Diomedes recognizes that the two of them are
connected through a two-generation-old bond of hospitality (Il. 6.119–
211). Following this recognition comes the exchange in which Glaukos
gives to Diomedes a golden panoply and in return receives a bronze
panoply from Diomedes (Il. 6.230–236).

76
This exchange episode between Diomedes and Glaukos has caused
problems of interpretation: the poet of the received text inserts his own
explanation for the unequal exchange, a rare occurrence in both the Iliad
and Odyssey, as well as the Homeric Hymns (Il. 6.234).113 Calder remarks
of this narratorial insertion that by the time Plato was writing, the
expression chrusea chalkeiôn (“gold for the price of bronze”) “had become
an elegant reference to an unfair bargain.”114 Indeed, Plato makes
Socrates quote from this episode in the Symposium (218e–219a) in order
to reprimand Alcibiades for trying to obtain for himself the better side
of a trade, notably a trade involving the non-corporeal exchange of an
Ideal (Symp. 218d–e). Aristotle too takes it upon himself in the
Nicomachean Ethics (1136b5–10) to comment on the episode, writing that:

ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον
τῷ Διομήδει “χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων,” οὐκ
ἀδικεῖται: ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ
ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ
ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.115
Arist. Eth. Nic. 1136b
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See ad loc. in Graziosi and Haubold 2010; Fortson 2010: §2.12.
Calder 1984: 31. This claim is complicated by the fact that the expression occurs
nowhere else.
115
Aristotle, in his discussion of the scene, uses the verb didômi, perhaps suggesting
that he was thinking of the passage as representative of a typical scene of giving and
avoids engaging with the problematic text.
114
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He who gives his own things, just as Homer says that Glaukos
gave to Diomedes “gold for bronze, a hecatomb for nine oxen,”
does not suﬀer injustice: for giving is a personal choice, and
suﬀering injustice is not self-inflicted, but it is necessary that
someone undertake being unjust. Therefore, it is clear that,
concerning being treated unjustly, it is not a willing thing.

In a note in The Classical Review, J. D. Craig argues that there is no
problem with the exchange: Glaukos “was conscious of his inferiority in
the presence of the overbearing Diomede... he was heartily glad to part
from his new friend, even at the price of gold for bronze.”116 To Craig’s
reading, P. Walcot adds that Glaukos “is very willing to hand over to
Diomede[s] armour, however valuable, in return for a gift infinitely
more precious, his own life.”117 These two scholars, as Walcot puts it,
“seek a human motive to explain Glaucos’ action.”118 Although the
appeal to human emotion as a solution holds a certain amount of
empathetic reasoning, we might also here mention Willcocks’
declaration that “it is not diﬃcult to deduce that Glaucus is nervous,”
arguing that “we should not let the pathos of the parallel with leaves,
and the fascination of the fable of Bellerophon, blind us to the fact that
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Craig 1967: 244.
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Glaucus is maundering.”119 Even so, it is an established narrative feature
of Homeric epic to diverge from the main narrative in such a descriptive
fashion, as Auerbach’s “The Scar of Odysseus” shows us.120 I believe that
looking for emotional reasons for Glaukos’ unequal exchange departs
too far from the textual evidence to be a defensible position. Nowhere
in the text of the exchange do we have any evidence for Glaukos’
emotional state being the motivating factor for his willingness to
participate in the exchange. Indeed, if we are concerned with the
emotional state of the participants, we might recall that Diomedes, right
before the epiphany and oﬀer, rejoiced (gêthêthen Il. 6.212) upon hearing
the news which lead to their armistice. We could argue that Diomedes
was glad he need not fight against the superior Glaukos. Furthermore,
if, as Vernant argues, the hero faces dishonour by showing cowardice,
we might find it hard to believe that Glaukos would take this path:121
for Glaukos seems to have challenged Diomedes of his own accord (Il.
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Willcock 1992: 87. Cf. Alden 2000: 167, “The career of Bellerophon functions as a
paradigmatic warning to Diomedes as he listens to it: Bellerophon enjoyed
extraordinary favour from the gods, but this favour was suddenly withdrawn in an
apparently arbitrary fashion, and the same thing might happen to Diomede, who has
been achieving remarkable feats under the patronage of Athene just before he hears
about Bellerophon.” There does not seem to be any idea in Alden of Glaukos
maundering out of fear, but as we will see below, the genealogy, and important part of
heroic identification, served a deeper narrative purpose than merely Glaukos buying
time. See also generally Alden 2000: 128–142.
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Auerbach 2003: ch. 1 passim.
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Vernant 1991: 51.
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6.119-126) and takes seriously his honour (Il. 6.206–210). Indeed,
throughout the Iliad, Diomedes is never said to be afraid, or depicted as
acting unheroically.122 Should we thus ascribe to Glaukos a feeling of
inferiority in the face of Diomedes? In eﬀect, the argument advanced by
these scholars, I argue, is too dependent on appeals to emotions which
are not mentioned in the text and which go against the received textual
evidence concerning Glaukos’ cowardice. In this vein de Jong argues
that the exposition of Glaukos’ genealogy serves two purposes: he claims
to be equal to Diomedes in terms of heroic lineage and also reminds
himself of the conduct by which he must abide, being a descendant in
such a noble family.123 This, she argues, shows that Glaukos is selfconfident in his own equality to Diomedes, he is unafraid of the
anticipated duel.
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We are told of Glaukos that he is second-in-command to Sarpedon of the Lykians
(Il. 2.876); that he had advanced to the ‘no-man’s land’ of the idealised battlefield in
which heroes seek single combat (Il. 6.119); that Sarpedon hand-picked Glaukos
because he was “above all others the bravest” (Il. 12.103–104; “διακρὶδον εἶναι ἄριστοι
/ τῶν ἄλλων”); that the Lykians considered him to be, along with Sarpedon, the best
of the Lykians (Il. 12.310–328); Sarpedon, dying, calls him a “fighter among men”
(πολεμιστὰ μετ᾽ ἀνδράσι, Il. 16.492); he is the first of the Lykians to turn back toward
the onslaught of Patroklos (Il. 16.593–594); he is able, unlike Thersites’ attempt with
Agamemnon, to reproach Hektor (Il. 17.140–168); and he is given the epithet
‘blameless’ (Il. 2.876, 14.426, perhaps inherited or projected backward onto his
grandfather Bellerophon, Il. 6.155). The only time he retreats is after he has been
injured, while scaling the Greek wall (Il. 12.387–391).
123
de Jong 1987: 160–167

80
William M. Calder argues the opposite: “Diomedes, after hearing the
glorious lineage and noble attainments of Glaucos…admits by his oﬀer
of the unequal exchange Glaucos’ superiority.”124 Calder argues this by
asserting that the giver of the superior gift is himself superior,125 using
Achilles’ refusal of Agamemnon’s oﬀer and acceptance of Priam’s oﬀer
as analogous examples, which supposedly illustrate this power
dynamic.126 Firstly, we must note that these two ‘analogous’ scenes lack
the same linguistic features of the Diomedes-Glaukos scene: in our case
we have an exchange of full armour, taken to be a gift compared against
the payment of apoina, ransom, in the Achilles scenes (Il. 9.120;
24.502).127 The diﬀerence is crucial: one may refuse to accept a ransom,
as happens in the Iliad,128 but nowhere do we find a gift rejected.129 In
fact, Walter Donlan writes that “giving is never meant to overawe or to
display superiority,”130 a fact, which apart from Agamemnon’s oﬀer,
holds true throughout the Iliad.
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Compare with Mauss 1970: 11, who argues that rejection of a gift was impossible
without detrimental consequences.
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Some have chosen to seek an explanation for the unequal exchange
by recourse to potlatch societies.131 The idea behind this comes, no
doubt,

from

a

misapplication

of

Mauss’

research.

Mauss’

anthropological investigations dealt with a few American tribes who
practiced potlatch, which Mauss describes as follows:

But, in these two latter tribes of the American Northwest, and
throughout this region, there appears to be a form of these
total prestations that is characteristic, certainly, but more
developed and relatively rare… But what is remarkable in these
tribes is the principle of rivalry and antagonism that dominated
all these practices. People go so far as to fight, even killing
chiefs and nobles who confront each other in this way.
Furthermore, they go so far as to destroy any accumulated
wealth in a purely extravagant manner in order to outdo a
chief, simultaneously a rival and a partner (usually a
grandfather, father-in-law, or son-in-law).132

The characteristics of potlatch which Mauss notes are altogether absent
both from this isolated exchange, as well as from all other instances of
gift giving in the Iliad: there is no hint of rivalry in the language of our
scene; no deliberate destruction of property—in fact the passage
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suggests that they will each keep and use the armour of the other; and
instead of fighting one another, they abstain from doing so. Moreover,
this “relatively rare” practice, described by Mauss, is rooted in ritual
communal feasting which takes place during the winters in North
American native tribes during the 19th and 20th centuries

BC,

a social

engagement quite diﬀerent from that of Diomedes and Glaukos. If
indeed the potlatch was the mode of exchange which is represented in
the Iliad, we might ask ourselves: why does Diomedes then propose the
trade, knowing that under the social rules of potlatch, Glaukos’ by far
larger gift of reciprocation will dishonour him so much?
Other approaches to the episode read it more aesthetically. Gaisser
argues that the two heroes are put against each other for the moral eﬀect
of their diﬀering world-views.133 For Gaisser, Diomedes represents an
optimistic world-view in which mortals who appropriately honour the
gods will never be punished, whereas Glaukos represents a pessimistic
view, one in which mortals will, regardless of piety, fall victim to the
gods.134 Agreeing with Gaisser, Scodel concludes that the two speeches
delivered by the heroes represent two competing views of the
relationship between mortal and divine, concluding that Glaukos’ “own
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loss in the exchange of armor is a mild and almost funny proof of an
important and usually tragic truth,” viz. the mutability of the gods’
favour for mortals.135 Problematically, however, Scodel does not account
for why Glaukos must come out the worse in this situation. At the time
of the episode, he is not said to be in the gods’ favour or to be receiving
divine aid, and the mutability of the gods’ favour would be better
illustrated in Diomedes ‘losing out’, since he has been favoured by the
gods for a long while at this point.
Although these two arguments are, in my opinion, excellent literary
readings, we are left still with our original question: why do the two
warriors exchange their armour? Gaisser, who believes that the episode
between Diomedes and Glaukos should be read as part of a ring
composition with the Achilles-Priam scene in Book 24, writes:

At this point we are reminded of the remarks of Willcock and
Kakridis on the story of Niobe. "Niobe eats because Priam
must eat."136 In the present context, then, Bellerophon and
Oineus must exchange gifts because Diomedes and Glaucus are
to exchange armor.137
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Although the ring composition of these two episodes is quite nice, we
are left with what seems to be a circular argument. For the pair (viz.
Diomedes and Glaukos) do not need to give each other their armour in
the same way that Priam, being a mortal beholden to biological needs,
must eat. And further, the two can fulfil the ring composition by
exchanging something else with one another. Although the connection
between the episodes in Book 6 and 24 are literarily related, that fact
alone does not fully explain the exchange between Diomedes and
Glaukos. In order to expand the reading, we must analyse the scene’s
language, which the heretofore mentioned commenters all pass over.
My own approach to this scene will be based, much like the previous
sections of this paper, heavily on the language of the episode. Namely,
I will first examine closely the language of the scene and how it compares
to the language of the other instances of gift giving in our text. This will
allow us to consider the scene independently of modern theory, and how
it relates to similar language elsewhere in the poem, putting the
emphasis on the traditional use of words more than on the entire
‘feeling’ of the scene.
The scene is composed of two layers of narration: we have direct
speech from the participants and narratorial comments. Furthermore,
we might also divide the narratorial lines into ‘early’ and ‘later’, including
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in the latter category the lines at 6.235–236 on the grounds that they were
composed by a later poet who did not understand the scene.138 Whether
the scene is comprised of two or three levels of narration is a minor
point, however, and will not aﬀect our analysis. The important
distinction is that we have, as Levi-Strauss and Bourdieu point out, a
problem of objectivism: namely, the narratorial comments are akin to
anthropological observation, the practices are seen from an outside
perspective that can only oﬀer an ultimately subjective account. In our
case the comments about Zeus stealing Glaukos’ phrenas and the
problematic value discrepancy serve only to illustrate the subjective
understanding of the exchange. That is, the participants and the narrator
have diﬀering views about the nature of the practice which has taken
place: indeed, Diomedes claims that they will (ex)change (into) the
armour of the other in order to boast their guest-friendship, and leaves
out any notion of value, whilst the poet draws attention to the superior
value.
“Homeric characters often invoke Zeus when they try to account for
events they do not understand… Here it seems that the poet himself is
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See Calder 1984: 34, who argues that “the Geometric poet no longer understood
the custom,” with the implication being that the original passage entered the tradition
at a much earlier point in time.

86
puzzled by the implications of the exchange.”139 Similarly, Benjamin
Fortson writes that, “the narrator of the tale, interestingly, seems not to
understand the proceedings, and claims that Glaukos’ wits were addled.”
Fortson argues that the excessive value discrepancy is explained away as
repayment of a debt incurred two generations ago when his grandfather
was hosted by Oineus.140 Problematically, the Iliad does not oﬀer us any
comparisons against which to judge the veracity of this explanation:
nowhere are we told the values of each item given nor are we told by
characters or by the narrator that Glaukos is repaying a debt to
Diomedes. Instead, I think that Godelier’s insightful comment about
mutual indebtedness is especially applicable not only in this case, but in
general consideration of gifts in the Iliad.141 Godelier convincingly
argues that giving is not an economic transaction, in that one party need
not repay exactly what the other had given, but instead the goal is that
each party will be bound to the other. If Fortson’s suggestion were
correct, it would eﬀectively mean that gift giving played no prolonged
role in social relations: once the recipient paid the donor an equivalent
amount for the original gift, the two would revert to whatever state
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existed between them before the original gift had been given and
accepted.142 Diomedes’ claim that the two would continue to serve as
guest-friends in the future serves as evidence of this mutual indebtedness
rather than a simple repayment and assumed dissolution of bonds (Il.
6.225–226).143

Furthermore,

Fortson’s

main

evidence

for

his

interpretation is only linguistic: he has created a rule out of the
implications of word-roots. Although Indo-European linguistics can be
profitable in a number of cases (especially diachronic contexts), most of
the time the data with which they work is not enough to allow full
reconstruction of social practices.
Again, too, if we wish to evoke Mauss, we will find at once that this
profit-driven mentality should not be taken into account: Mauss’
research demonstrates that profit is something which is to be avoided.144
And indeed, gift giving in the Iliad seems to work on the same premise.
In Book 1, when Achilles and Agamemnon begin their strife, Achilles’
insult to Agamemnon, calling him philoktêanôtate, lover of gain, (Il.
1.122) can be seen as expressive of the norms: it was uncouth, at least for
heroes, to desire the acquisition of physical goods for profit.
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Furthermore, apart from the sole line (Il. 6.236), inserted by a narrator,
there is no mention of profitability or value made of gifts given by the
participants; can we then apply modern economic values onto this text,
simply because we now have a tendency to view things in such a way?
Furthermore, we must take into account the role played by time in
gift giving. Firstly, we must note Mauss’ work. When Mauss introduced
the theory of the hau, relying on the Ranaipiri text, he failed to make
notice of the specific line “après qu’un certain temps s’est écoulé…”145
Indeed, the issue of time is taken up by Pierre Bourdieu in his The Logic
of Practice:
So long as one only considers practices which, like rituals,
derive some of their most important properties from the fact
that they are “detotalized” by their unfolding in succession, one
is liable to neglect those properties of practice that
detemporalizing science has least chance of reconstituting,
namely the properties it owes to the fact that it is constructed
in time, that time gives it its form…”146

How are we to reconcile this exchange (and others) in the Iliad where
the reciprocation is immediate? Do these not go against the idea
Bourdieu has in mind when he talks about the importance of time in
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gift giving, the power dynamics that result from an early reciprocation
or a late one? Furthermore, we have also to contend with the fact that
the majority of gifts given in the Iliad are entirely ‘totalised’ as single
instances: we do not have access to the practice’s full history, so to speak.
The problem arises that no single theory of gift giving accurately
reflects all of the instances: the very thing which a theory ought to do,
whether it be mathematical or anthropological. And indeed, in this
passage there is something strikingly unmathematical, something to
which we ought to pay attention, but which has been passed over
without comment by scholars thus far: namely the language the poet
uses in this scene.
The passage is notable for its multiple instances of idiosyncratic
language. Though it is interpreted by readers to be a standard gift
exchange, the passage lacks all sense of linguistic similarity to other gift
giving scenes in the Iliad. Of these, two scenes provide exact structural
analogues to the scene which we will be considering: namely, they both
involve one hero giving a gift to another, and then the immediate
reciprocation of that gift. Before we turn to these two analogous scenes,
let us first introduce the one on which we will be focused. It comes after
the above-mentioned exposition of lineage delivered by Glaukos’ and
Diomedes’ recognition-scene speech:
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Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσαντε καθ’ ἵππων ἀΐξαντε
χεῖράς τ’ ἀλλήλων λαβέτην καὶ πιστώσαντο·147
ἔνθ’ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς,
ὃς πρὸς Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε’ ἄμειβε
χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι’ ἐννεαβοίων
Il. 6.230–236

“But let us exchange panoplies with one another, so that
they might
know that we boast to be paternal guest-friends.”
And so, the two having spoken, jumped down from their
horses
and took the hands of the other and trusted each other.
And then Zeus, son of Kronos, stole away the mind from
Glaukos,
he exchanged panoplies with Diomedes, son of Tydeus,
gold for the price of bronze, a hecatomb for nine oxen.148

The first instance (both earliest in terms of the internal chronology of
the story as well as being the first to appear in the poem) which provides
us with a structural analogue occurs in an embedded speech. Diomedes,
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after hearing Glaukos’ noble lineage, rejoices (gêthêsen, Il. 6.212) and
says:

ἦ ῥά νύ μοι ξεῖνος πατρώϊός ἐσσι παλαιός·
Οἰνεὺς γάρ ποτε δῖος ἀμύμονα Βελλεροφόντην
ξείνισ’ ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐείκοσιν ἤματ’ ἐρύξας·
οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά·
Οἰνεὺς μὲν ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν,
Βελλεροφόντης δὲ χρύσεον δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον
καί μιν ἐγὼ κατέλειπον ἰὼν ἐν δώμασ’ ἐμοῖσι.
Il. 6.214–221

“It seems that you are my old paternal guest-friend;
For divine Oineus once hosted blameless Bellerophon
in his halls, having kept him for twenty days.
And they gave each other beautiful guest-gifts.
Oineus gave a war-belt, shining red,
and Bellerophon a golden two-handed cup,149
and coming [here], I left it behind at my house.”

The second analogue occurs in the following book, between Aias and
Hektor after their duel has been cut short by Zeus, who sent messengers
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and night to stop the fight so that neither hero would die (Il. 7.273–282).
At the end of their duel, Hektor says:

δῶρα δ’ ἄγ’ ἀλλήλοισι περικλυτὰ δώομεν ἄμφω...
Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας δῶκε ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον
σὺν κολεῷ τε φέρων καὶ ἐϋτμήτῳ τελαμῶνι·
Αἴας δὲ ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν
Il. 7.299; 303–305

“But come, let us both give glorious gifts to each other...”
And, so, having spoken, he gave a silver-studded sword
with both the sheath and well-cut belt.
And Aias gave a war-belt, shining red.

Right away we notice the dissimilarity of language between the original
passage and the two analogues. In the two analogous scenes the nouns
and verbs used by the poet are expressly related both to gifts and to the
act of giving. We find xeineion (Il. 6.216), didômi (Il. 6.216, 7.299, 7.303,
7.305), dôron (Il. 7.299). The first, as we noted above is the only noun to
which we can safely ascribe a specific type of gift giving: it is
etymologically connected to the guest-host relationship. The latter
words, though not intrinsically connected to some specific type of gift
giving, are both etymologically related to the act of giving in general.
Both come from the same root, *deh3(r/n)-, which has been
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reconstructed as meaning in its verbal form as “to give” and in its
nominal form as “gift”.150 When considering other, non-analogous,
exchanges (in which the gift is not immediately reciprocated), we also
find in each case the use of one or both reflexes of the *deh3(r/n)- root.
This, however, does not hold true for the famous exchange between
Diomedes and Glaukos. Instead, we find the verb (ep)ameibô and then
object-noun teuchea. Given that the institution is commonly called ‘gift
exchange’, this use of ameibô (“to exchange”) seems not to pose any real
issues in our interpretation of the passage as one of regular gift giving.151
Under further scrutiny, however, we find that this verb is problematic.
Etymologically we are on uncertain footing with this verb: modern
etymologies reconstruct the root as PIE *h2meigw (“to exchange”).152 This
root is not unproblematic, however, for it is constructed on the basis of
a single reflex in the daughter languages (viz. Gk. ameibô) and lacks any
cognates against which one might compare the meaning.153 The strength
of the comparative method depends on just that: comparison. The
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problems which result from reconstruction from only a single reflex are
evident when we consider the wide semantic fields of reflexes in a
number of daughter languages.154 With only one reflex for the proposed
root of ameibô, etymologies reconstruct the PIE root as meaning the same
thing as the Greek reflex. Problematically, however, the definition of
‘exchange (of corporeal objects)’ is rooted in use much later than
Homer.155
Ameibô appears throughout the Iliad, occurring no fewer than 170
times (including prefixed forms such as epameibô). Instead of
predominantly occurring in exchange scenarios of physical items, be
they gifts or otherwise, 125 (73.5%) of these instances are the narrator
introducing a verbal reply with a handful of formulaic phrases which
seem not to bear any relation to the nature of the reply or to the speech

154
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AP: He gave his wife in exchange [sc. for his life], she is now coming to
you below.
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to which the reply is made.156 Indeed, speech, especially in the Iliad,
plays an important role in defining power relations between people.157
Many of the remaining uses of ameibô are related not to corporeal objects
being exchanged, but to instances where the essential meaning of
something like ‘passing back and forth’ is required, without the
exchange of an object.158
When we consider the instances during which ameibô is used of
corporeal objects we see that it is used exclusively with panoplies
(teuchea, entea). In Book 14 we encounter a scene describing the
exchange of armour among the Greeks:

Ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδὲ πίθοντο·
τοὺς δ’ αὐτοὶ βασιλῆες ἐκόσμεον οὐτάμενοί περ
Τυδεΐδης Ὀδυσεύς τε καὶ Ἀτρεΐδης Ἀγαμέμνων·
οἰχόμενοι δ’ ἐπὶ πάντας ἀρήϊα τεύχε’ ἄμειβον·
ἐσθλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὸς ἔδυνε, χέρεια δὲ χείρονι δόσκεν.159
156
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Il. 14.378–382

So, he spoke, and they listened to him well and obeyed.
The kings themselves marshalled the men, though
they were wounded, Tydeus’ son, Odysseus, and Atreus’ son
Agamemnon.
Going through all the men, they exchanged war panoplies:
Good men wore good arms, and they gave the worse armour to
the worse men.

This exchange is brought about because many of the heroes have been
injured and cannot fight. The implications of this changing-of-armour
will be discussed below. Later in the poem, after Hektor has slain
Patroklos and stripped him of Achilles’ armour, we read that:

οἳ προτὶ ἄστυ φέρον κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος.
στὰς δ’ ἀπάνευθε μάχης πολυδακρύου ἔντε’ ἄμειβεν·
Il. 17.190–191

He was carrying the glorious armour of Peleus’ son to the city.
Standing apart from tearful battle he changed armour.

What both of these passages show, I argue, is that ameibô is not a word
connected to gift giving. Indeed, its only uses with a corporeal object in
the entire poem are connected to exchanging (and, especially, the idea
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of changing into) the armour of someone else, and especially connected
with the idea of changing into better armour (i.e. the armour of a better
fighter). Indeed, this reading of the use of (ep)ameibô is not only rooted
in the textual use of the verb elsewhere, as shown above, but also the
most sensical given the situation. The two must wear the armour of the
other for the lines proclaiming that they will show oﬀ their bond to
make sense (Il. 6.230–231): without wearing the other’s armour, they
cannot boast to others of their inherited friendship, for nobody would
see the evidence of it.
When we look outside of the poem for evidence of this reading of
ameibô, we find much the same: in the Homeric Hymns, Hesiod, and
the early Greek poets, there is no use of ameibô to mean the exchange of
corporeal goods between parties participating in gift giving. Apart from
its use in the standard formulaic response-phrase, it occurs only once in
poetry of the early hexameter tradition with a deviant meaning, in a line
stressing a change of ontological sorts:

Ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε
γῆρας ἀπωσαμένη, περί τ’ ἀμφί τε κάλλος ἄητο.
H.H. Ceres 275–276

So, having spoken, the goddess changed [her] stature and form,
driving away old age, and beauty breathed all around [her].
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To this we can add that in the Lyric poets we find much the same use
of ameibô. Solon (ca. 640–560),160 for instance, provides two examples of
non-responsive usages. In fr. 2 (1–2) he writes:

εἴην δὴ τότ᾿ ἐγὼ Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινήτης
ἀντί γ᾿ Ἀθηναίου πατρίδ᾿ ἀμειψάμενος·

“Would that I were a Pholegandrian or Skinite
instead of an Athenian, changing [my] nationality.”

While in fr. 27 (5–6) he writes:

τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων
λαχνοῦται, χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης.

“In the third, with this body still growing, his chin
grows hair, and with skin changing brightness.”

In these later examples we can see that the idea of a mutational change
is tied up in the meaning of ameibô. Without this meaning of change,
the lines would lose meaning.
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My contention, then, based on these representative examples, is that
the word ameibô and its prefixed forms, in the early Greek hexameter
tradition and in lyric, does not semantically mean ‘to exchange physical
goods’ as both ancient and contemporary critics have interpreted.
Instead, it seems to me that the traditional meaning of the word, when
used outside of formulaic-response phrases, is one related to ontological
change, whether or not that be physical or ‘true’ ontological change as
Malabou classifies it.161 And so, we have, I think, two options for our
interpretation of this passage at Il. 6.230–236. On the one hand, we
might argue that the passage is a later interpolation from a time during
which ameibô was commonly used in scenarios of exchange between two
(or more) parties. Indeed, since there are no external quotations of this
line from before the composition of Plato’s Symposium (which is argued
to have been composed somewhere between 384–379 BC),162 or mentions
of Diomedes and Glaukos together before Aristotle, it is tempting to
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possession in the Iliad, the characters seem to suﬀer no characterological change
afterward, but during the possession do lose control of both their body (and mind, if
we read this from a dualist perspective).
162
Dover 1980: 10.
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speculate that the passage crept into the poem at a later date.163 Of
course, since there is no sustained tradition of referencing the line or
characters after Plato and Aristotle, it is not implausible that the scene
was simply not mentioned in literature in general.164 Our second
recourse is to explain the passage’s deviant language with an appeal to
internal poetic aesthetics, on the assumption that the lines are part of a
traditional story and have meaning within the poem. This approach, I
think, allows us for a profitable re-reading of the scene.
The recent work of both Derek Collins and Alex Purves provides
readings of other scenes which highlight the ontological change
resultant from the use of armour. In Immortal Armor, Collins advances
the argument that the wearing of armour, especially in the passage cited
above (Il. 17.190–191) in which Hektor equips himself with the armour
of the slain Patroklos (the armour is, of course, genealogically connected
to the gods: it was fashioned by Hephaistos, given to Peleus on his
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See, e.g. Seaford (1994: 338–344), who discusses the relatively later composition of
Book 9, and a potential Athenian origin of Book 9, which shares language with
Aeschylus. Aeschylus, however, does not use ameibô in the same way our passage does,
but this is of course not proof that the verb was not used by that time to mean an
exchange of goods between persons. It seems, however, clumsy to depart so far from
the standard terminology of gifts and giving on behalf of a later poet. Furthermore, it
could be argued that Aeschylus shares language with Homer, instead of the other way
around.
164
This lack of literary trace seems to call into question Calder’s (1984: 31) quote from
above implying that the expression was common or current. Of course, the passage
might have been cited in works which do not survive, but if it were common, we might
expect it to appear more than twice in the extant sources.
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wedding day as a gift, and then given by Peleus to Achilles, before it is
lent to Patroklos), results in a religious possession, and in Hektor’s case,
possession by Ares:

…δῦ δε μιν Ἄρης
Δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλῆσθεν δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ μέλε᾽ ἐντὸς
ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος.
Il. 17.210–212

…and Ares entered him,
The terrible war-like one, and inside him, his limbs were filled
With alkê and sthenos.165

As Collins continues, “once a divinity is inside a person, he is thought
to lose consciousness of self, his self-awareness, and the divinity is
believed to work through him.”166 This possession-by-armour is
precisely an ontological change—the ‘host’, in this case Hektor, is no
longer himself. Collins believes that this phenomenon of possession-byarmour is implicit in instances during which it is not narrated, and that
it was a common cultic acceptance in Archaic Greece. He argues that
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Both Greek terms, alkê and sthenos, are left untranslated here, as they both mean
‘force’, but each term has a slightly diﬀerent meaning: Benveniste 2016: 361 defines
alkê as spiritual force’ and sthenos as ‘physical force’. See in general Benveniste 2016:
361–371 and Stocking (forthcoming) for discussion of force-terms in Homer.
166
Collins 1998: 17.
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Patroklos disobeys the warning Achilles gives167 because in putting on
Achilles’ armour, he is possessed and undergoes the same sort of
ontological change as is explicitly narrated of Hektor (Il. 17.210ﬀ).168
Thus, for Collins, donning armour is an act which is equal to an
ontological change of the self in the poetics of Homeric epic (and also
perhaps in the real world): one becomes possessed and acted through.
In addition to this possession proposed by Collins, we can argue that
the equipping of armour results in another sort of ontological change:
one where the person and armour become a unified whole, rather than
merely conjoined subject and an object. Alex Purves, in her recent article
“Ajax and Other Objects: Homer’s Vibrant Materialism”, writes “that
for Homeric heroes, and for Ajax in particular, there is a special sense in
which arms and body can merge, allowing for a moving boundary
between inner and outer self, as well as between human and nonhuman
materials.”169 Melissa Mueller, in discussing the epic hero “as a perfectly
blended person-weapon,” cites Geometric vase painters’ tendency to
depict warriors’ bodies as shields as visual evidence of this blending of
person and arms, whereby “warriors are their weapons.”170 In these
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At Il. 16.83–87 Achilles tells Patroklos only to drive the Trojans from the Greek
ships and not to pursue combat after that is accomplished.
168
Collins 1998: 36.
169
Purves 2015: 83–84.
170
Mueller 2016: 34–35; her italics.
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views, when a Homeric warrior puts on his armour, he undergoes a
change which results in his body and arms becoming part of one another
in a unified whole. In essence, he becomes something else.
Furthermore, putting on armour can result in another type of change
in the person: one in which they eﬀectively become someone else. This
change of identity is most clearly visible in Patroklos, who asks for
Achilles’ armour so that the “Trojans imagine me to be you” (Il. 16.41–
42 “ἐμέ σοὶ ἴσκοντες… | Τρῶες”),171 thereby evincing fear in the Trojans
and hope in the Greeks, upon whom a great “grief has fallen” (Il. 16.22
“τοῖον γὰρ ἄχος βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς”). This impersonation is even able to
result in Achilles receiving the timê (honour in the form of goods) and
kudos (glory) for Patroklos’ deeds while in the armour (Il. 16.83–85),
suggesting that for this purpose Patroklos does not just impersonate
Achilles, but becomes him in the sense that Patroklos’ actions will be
considered to be Achilles’. As Yamagata writes, “the idea of clothing as
means of distinguishing diﬀerent groups of people or individuals from
one another is deeply embedded in Homer’s poetry.”172 Indeed, in the
Odyssey, Odysseus’ clothing reflects his changing identity throughout
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The Greek iskontes is a participle, but due to the infelicities of English I have used
a finite verb form. The original Greek includes a main verb (aposchontai ‘let them be
kept at bay’) which is omitted here.
172
Yamagata 2005: 539.
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the poem.173 And in the Iliad, “the warrior’s identity is inseparably
bound up with his armour,” suggesting that when Patroklos dons
Achilles’ armour, he undergoes an identity shift. So, the use of
(ep)aimebô in the Diomedes and Glaukos episode can be read as
implying some sort of impending change in the participants.
When we direct our attention away from the verb and onto the object
of exchange in the episode, we are faced with a second problem. We are
told that Diomedes and Glaukos exchange with one another full
panoplies of armour (Il. 6.235). When we consider all gifts given between
mortals, we realise that the repertoire of martial gifts given does not
include panoplies. As Donlan writes, in addition to belts, martial gifts
given by mortals consist “of swords, breastplates, spears, or bows.”174 The
only instances of full panoplies being given as gifts are from the gods.
Achilles’ original set of armour, in which Patroklos went to his death,
was given by the gods to Peleus on the occasion of his marriage to Thetis
(Il. 18.82–85). Achilles refers to the set of armour explicitly as a gift (dôra,
Il. 18.84) in this passage.175 The second instance of a set of armour being
given as a gift is at the opening of Book 19: Thetis herself comes bearing

173

Yamagata 2005: 540.
Donlan 1989: 11.
175
Interestingly at Il. 17.192–197, the narrator does not explicitly call the armour a gift
given to Peleus nor mention the occasion on which it was given.
174
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the gifts of the god (ἳκανε θεοῦ πάρα δῶρα φέρουσα, Il. 18.3), by which
the panoply made by Hephaistos in the previous Book is meant.176
Furthermore, whenever the poet refers to a set of armour as a gift, either
in embedded speech or in narratorial voice, the referent is only ever godgiven panoplies (Il. 19.368; 20.268).177 Not only does the passage lack a
traditional gift giving verb, but also a traditional gift!
Having shown that the episode between Diomedes and Glaukos is,
contra current interpretations, not simply an instance of gift giving, the
question remains: what, then, is the scene supposed to be? I believe we
might look to instances of armour changing hands between mortals for
an answer: the practice of stripping a defeated opponent’s armour, which
is by far the most common method in the Iliad by which panoplies
change hands. This practice is essentially one of exchange: the victor of
the fight, as a token of the timê he has earned by virtue of besting his
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Canevaro (2018: 53) writes, “notably, though Hephaistos creates gifts, he is never
emphasized as the giver.” She notes (2018:53) that it is Thetis who gives Achilles the
armour he has made and Hera who oﬀers to give Hypnos a throne made by
Hephaistos.
177
Graziosi and Haubold (2010: ad loc.) comment that this gold panoply might be the
reason for Diomedes’ asking whether he was addressing a god or not; for gold armour
is divine and thus perhaps a gift from Hephaistos (following the scholia, which calls
the armour of Glaukos Ἡφαιστότευκτα: ΣT ad 6.234b1). Problematic for this theory is
that when the poem makes mention of Achilles’ armour, its divine origins are recorded
(e.g. Il. 18.83–84; 19.3, 18, 367; 20.265, 268; 21.165, 594). One would think that the
divinity of the armour would have likewise been recorded in this instance if it were
true. Thus, I believe that the armour only seems to be divine, rather than being actually
divine.
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opponent, is aﬀorded the right to strip the slain enemy of his armour.
In so doing, the victor is able both to increase his material possessions
and his honour. It is understood that the victor will abide by the ethical
expectations of a hero (within the poem, at least—for there is no
evidence that this heroic ‘ideal’ was universally accepted by all Greeks
living at some point during the formation of the Iliad) and allow the
slain opponent to be aﬀorded the proper funeral rites. This ethical
custom is made explicit by Hektor:

ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δεῦρο θεοὺς ἐπιδώμεθα: τοὶ γὰρ ἄριστοι
μάρτυροι ἔσσονται καὶ ἐπίσκοποι ἁρμονιάων·
οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ σ᾽ ἔκπαγλον ἀεικιῶ, αἴ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεὺς
δώῃ καμμονίην, σὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀφέλωμαι·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἄρ κέ σε συλήσω κλυτὰ τεύχε᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ
νεκρὸν Ἀχαιοῖσιν δώσω πάλιν· ὣς δὲ σὺ ῥέζειν.
Il. 22.254–259

“but come, let us take as witnesses the gods here: for they will
be
The best witnesses and observers of [our] agreements.
For I will not treat you, violent one, unjustly, if Zeus gives
Me victory and I take away your life-force.
But after I strip you of your famous armour, Achilles,
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I will give back your corpse to the Achaeans. Do you promise
likewise?”178

This passage, spoken between the bitterest of enemies (at least from
Achilles’ point of view; Hektor does not bear the same anger toward
Achilles) makes it clear that there is an accepted ethical obligation
between opposing combatants. And indeed, this ethical custom is
observed throughout the Iliad, except in the notable instance of this
passage, in which Achilles, shortly before killing and defiling Hektor’s
body (Il. 22.367–404), rejects the oﬀer extended by Hektor (Il. 22.261–
272).179
To be sure, the scene does aﬃrm and exemplify the duty, which those
bound by xenia must obey, of friendship and its hierarchical place in a
scale of ethics: the bond clearly is superior to the dissolution of bonds

178

One also thinks of Il. 17.201ﬀ where Zeus makes a comment that Hektor should
not have taken (Il. 17.205, ou kata kosmon) the armour of slain Patroklοs. But this
instance, however, is exceptional since the armour is a divine possession which did not
belong to Patroklos, and so is technically not his to lose. Furthermore, in this scene we
can read that the implication of stripping one’s enemy’s armour is perhaps something
based in merit. In this case, Hektor gains possession of Achilles’ armour, the armour
of a man whom he did not best, and therefore, armour which he does not merit.
179
Achilles’ rejection of this custom is likely rooted in his rejection of humanity
brought about by the death of Patroklos. Not long before this, the narrator employs
an animalistic simile to describe Achilles, likening him to a dog (Il. 22.189–193), and
in his response to Hektor’s request (Il. 22.254–259), Achilles himself employs an
animalistic simile (Il. 22.260–265). This descent into the animalistic is most expressed
in Achilles᾽ desire to eat Hektor’s flesh raw (Il. 22.346–347).

108
brought about by war.180 Of course, this does not explain the language
of the passage, but merely reduces it to its socio-political function. I
argue that what seems to be happening in this passage is a deception—
a deception which takes place on two levels. On the one hand, the poet
of the text structures the episode so that it mimics, though not exactly,
the conventional literary representation of guest-host type-scenes.
When the two heroes meet, “what ensues…is a dialogue that seems
perhaps more fitting in a hospitality scene. For Diomedes’ inquiry after
Glaukos’ name is the first question a host asks of his guest.”181 Especially
troubling, however, for a literal interpretation of the episode as a banal
hospitality scene transplanted from the home to the battlefield,182 is that
these type-scenes, “including… gift giving” are “all composed in highly
formulaic diction.”183 What this means, I believe, is that, on the one

180

We might compare this episode to the gifts of Hektor and Aias, who exchange with
one another gifts at the end of their duel and part in friendship, “en philotêti” (Il. 7.299–
302). Notably, however, Aias and Hektor return to fighting one another after they give
gifts to one another (see Ch. 2)
181
Newton 2009: 59–60. Reece 1993: ch.1 discusses at length the conventions of
Homeric hospitality scenes.
182
Newton 2009: 61 describes the battlefield as a metaphorical house of Diomedes:
“Glaukos has entered Diomedes’ house, identified here as the space between the armies
in which Diomedes has been freely ranging. Exceptionally eager for a fight, Glaukos
has burst into this zone and stands at the threshold of Diomedes’ domain.” Writing
on Virginia Woolf, Simone (2017: 95) writes that “as a guest requires as host, which
in turn implies some sense of ownership of place,” further suggesting that the
battlefield can be conceived as being symbolically (or really) owned by Diomedes
during his aristeia.
183
Reece 1993: 5. Even though Reece argues for the highly formulaic language of these
type-scenes, he includes teuchea, illustrated by our deviant scene, as an example of a
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hand, the loose adherence to the literary conventions, and on the other
hand, the unformulaic language which appears at precisely the height of
this scene signal that we are not in fact dealing with a transposed-butconventional hospitality scene. Instead, Diomedes, by exploiting the
accidental (to him, but surely not to the poet) encounter with and
recognition of an enemy with whom he shares a two-generation-old
bond of xenia, is able to initiate a symbolic procedure of armour
stripping.
This process of symbolic armour stripping is brought about by a
number of factors. As mentioned above, full panoplies are only given as
gifts by gods and described as gifts by characters and narrator if they
were god-given. The most common method by which panoplies change
hands between mortals in the Iliad is by stripping a defeated enemy in
battle. Since this practice of armour stripping is economic,184 the
narrator’s comments at Il. 6.234 can be understood as the reaction to the
solely real (i.e. not symbolic) economic side of this episode.
That the superior warrior wins the armour of his opponent suggests
that Diomedes and Glaukos part as equals, given that they each get to

guest-gift (Reece 1993: 36). Furthermore, it should be noted that even though Reece
cites this example as a guest-gift, he does not include this scene itself as a metaphorical
guest-host scene.
184
Armour stripping participates in both real and symbolic economy: the victor wins a
valuable metal, as well as the symbolic capital attendant to his being victorious in
battle.
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participate in the symbolic stripping of the other. Indeed, as we have
seen, it is made clear in the text that warriors will only use armour that
reflects their own martial ability (i.e. good warriors will not use armour
that is beneath their status). In changing into the armour of the other,
Diomedes and Glaukos admit non-verbally that they are at least equals,
or that they view each other as better than themselves.
In this case, contrary to critics’ fixation upon who came out the
symbolic victor of this exchange, we are left with a stalemate. (Or else,
each participant believes the other to be better, suggesting a subjective
hierarchy rather than the objective one needed to assert that one of the
two is the ‘victor’). Both participants in the episode leave with timê, they
each obtain the armour of their enemy-turned-friend, which can be seen
as a declaration of martial equality, as well, given that the wearing of
armour, as we saw above, seems to be linked with a sense of merit. Does
Diomedes have more timê simply because the armour he stripped is
more monetarily valuable? Does Glaukos ‘win’ because his prize is from
one of the foremost Greek warriors, one who was able to wound a god?
Indeed, Diomedes is the Greek who is most active, killing the highest
number of men in the poem. Ultimately, I believe that this reading of
the scene adds to the understanding of the episode: we should not argue
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that it is only a gift giving scene. Rather, through a close reading of the
scene’s language, we are able to add dimension to our reading.
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CONCLUSION

hat I hope to have shown in the three chapters above is

W

that the study of the gift in the Iliad (and in Homeric
poetry in general) does not support the current

structuralist theories or does not allow for a strict structuralist
interpretation. In the first chapter, I illustrated how an approach which
aims to show that the language of the poem is reflective of the idea that
gifts given in certain situations were marked by language. I introduced
the argument that the specific words were not indicative of a solidified
idea of diﬀerent forms of gift, but rather were aesthetic, used to
highlight a significant scene. For instance, when the poet uses a nonstandard word (i.e. another word than dôron) for a gift, the eﬀect, as the
Russian Formalists argued, would serve to draw the audience toward the
scene for being diﬀerent.
In the second chapter, I showed that the idea of a universal
understanding of the gift in the Iliad seems to be incompatible with the
standard theories of the gift, which argues either that gifts are truly freely
given or at least believed to be freely given by the participants of the
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exchange,

which

diﬀerentiates

gifts

from

outright

economic

transactions.
In the final chapter, I applied the conclusions from the previous
chapters in a close reading of the Diomedes and Glaukos episode in
Book 6. By being attendant to the language of the scene, I showed that
it is diﬀerent from every other instance of gift giving in the Iliad. By
comparing the scene’s language with other similar language, I argued
for a novel reading of the scene which adds to the interpretation of the
problematic exchange.
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